Stable Invitations
Abstract
We consider the situation in which an organizer is trying to convene an event, and needs to choose a subset of agents to be invited. Agents have preferences over how many attendees should be at the event and possibly also who the attendees should be. This induces a stability requirement: All invited agents should prefer attending to not attending, and all the other agents should not regret being not invited. The organizer's objective is to find the invitation of maximum size subject to the stability requirement. We investigate the computational complexity of finding the maximum stable invitation when all agents are truthful, as well as the mechanism design problem when agents may strategically misreport their preferences.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1405.7751,
title = {Stable Invitations},
author = {Hooyeon Lee and Yoav Shoham},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1405.7751},
year = {2014}
}
Comments
To appear in COMSOC 2014