Related papers: Coalition Formability Semantics with Conflict-Elim…
Game semantics describe the interactive behavior of proofs by interpreting formulas as games on which proofs induce strategies. Such a semantics is introduced here for capturing dependencies induced by quantifications in first-order…
Given a set of conflicting arguments, there can exist multiple plausible opinions about which arguments should be accepted, rejected, or deemed undecided. We study the problem of how multiple such judgments can be aggregated. We define the…
Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced in arXiv:1307.2145, arXiv:1403.4958. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given…
Argumentation is the process of constructing arguments about propositions, and the assignment of statements of confidence to those propositions based on the nature and relative strength of their supporting arguments. The process is modelled…
Abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs) provide a formal setting to analyze many forms of reasoning with conflicting information. While the expressiveness of general infinite AFs make them a tempting tool for modeling many kinds of…
We consider an operatorial model of alliances between three political parties which interact with their electors, with the undecided voters, and with the electors of the other parties. This extends what was done in a previous paper, where…
Humans currently use arguments for explaining choices which are already made, or for evaluating potential choices. Each potential choice has usually pros and cons of various strengths. In spite of the usefulness of arguments in a decision…
We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations,…
We consider manipulations in the context of coalitional games, where a coalition aims to increase the total payoff of its members. An allocation rule is immune to coalitional manipulation if no coalition can benefit from internal…
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. We provide conditions…
Inspired by e-participation systems, in this paper we propose a new model to represent human debates and methods to obtain collective conclusions from them. This model overcomes drawbacks of existing approaches by allowing users to…
Coalition Logic is an important logic in logical research on strategic reasoning. In two recent papers, Li and Ju argued that generally, concurrent game models, models of Coalition Logic, have three too strong assumptions: seriality,…
Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they…
Realizability for knowledge representation formalisms studies the following question: given a semantics and a set of interpretations, is there a knowledge base whose semantics coincides exactly with the given interpretation set? We…
In many situations when people are assigned to coalitions, the utility of each person depends on the friends in her coalition. Additionally, in many situations, the size of each coalition should be bounded. This paper studies such coalition…
The existence of a coalition strategy to achieve a goal does not necessarily mean that the coalition has enough information to know how to follow the strategy. Neither does it mean that the coalition knows that such a strategy exists. The…
The Expansion property considered by researchers in Social Choice is shown to correspond to a logical property of nonmonotonic consequence relations that is the {\em pure}, i.e., not involving connectives, version of a previously known weak…
Game semantics describe the interactive behavior of proofs by interpreting formulas as games on which proofs induce strategies. Such a semantics is introduced here for capturing dependencies induced by quantifications in first-order…
We revisit the notion of initial sets by Xu and Cayrol, i.e., non-empty minimal admissible sets in abstract argumentation frameworks. Initial sets are a simple concept for analysing conflicts in an abstract argumentation framework and to…
Argumentation is based on the exchange and valuation of interacting arguments, followed by the selection of the most acceptable of them (for example, in order to take a decision, to make a choice). Starting from the framework proposed by…