Related papers: Coalition Formability Semantics with Conflict-Elim…
In many economic, social and political situations individuals carry out activities in groups (coalitions) rather than alone and on their own. Examples range from households and sport clubs to research networks, political parties and trade…
We introduce First-Order Coalition Logic ($\mathsf{FOCL}$), which combines key intuitions behind Coalition Logic ($\mathsf{CL}$) and Strategy Logic ($\mathsf{SL}$). Specifically, $\mathsf{FOCL}$ allows for arbitrary quantification over…
Coalition forming is investigated among countries, which are coupled with short range interactions, under the influence of external fields produced by the existence of global alliances. The model rests on the natural model of coalition…
A model of knowledge representation is described in which propositional facts and the relationships among them can be supported by other facts. The set of knowledge which can be supported is called the set of cognitive units, each having…
We consider a set of agents who have claims on an endowment that is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions but a minimal coalition size $\theta$ is required to have positive coalitional funding that is proportional…
We revisit games in partition function form, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We assume that each coalition computes its worth having probabilistic beliefs over…
Coalition logic is one of the most popular logics for multi-agent systems. While epistemic extensions of coalition logic have received much attention, existence of their complete axiomatisations has so far been an open problem. In this…
Coalition Logic is a central logic in logical research on strategic reasoning. In a recent paper, Li and Ju argued that generally, models of Coalition Logic, concurrent game models, have three too strong assumptions: seriality, independence…
We present a general formal argumentation system for dealing with the detachment of conditional obligations. Given a set of facts, constraints, and conditional obligations, we answer the question whether an unconditional obligation is…
A coalition is blameable for an outcome if the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. It has been previously suggested that the cost of prevention, or the cost of sacrifice, can be used to measure the degree of blameworthiness. The paper…
In this paper we address the problem of coalition formation in hedonic context. Our modelling tries to be as realistic as possible. In previous models, once an agent joins a coalition it would not be able to leave the coalition and join the…
Hedonic games are an archetypal problem in coalition formation, where a set of selfish agents want to partition themselves into stable coalitions. In this work, we focus on two natural constraints on the possible outcomes. First, we require…
Decision makers are often confronted with complex tasks which cannot be solved by an individual alone, but require collaboration in the form of a coalition. Previous literature argues that instability, in terms of the re-organization of a…
Since the introduction by Hodges, and refinement by V\"a\"an\"anen, team semantic constructions have been used to generate expressively enriched logics still conserving nice properties, such as compactness or decidability. In contrast,…
Argumentation frameworks, consisting of arguments and an attack relation representing conflicts, are fundamental for formally studying reasoning under conflicting information. We use methods from mathematical logic, specifically…
We introduce the concept of an {\em operator decision making technique} and apply it to a concrete political problem: should a given political party form a coalition or not? We focus on the situation of three political parties, and divide…
Humans engage in informal debates on a daily basis. By expressing their opinions and ideas in an argumentative fashion, they are able to gain a deeper understanding of a given problem and in some cases, find the best possible course of…
This work shows that the formation of a finite number of coalitions in a nonatomic network congestion game benefits everyone. At the equilibrium of the composite game played by coalitions and individuals, the average cost to each coalition…
Although there is a somewhat standard formalization of computability on countable sets given by Turing machines, the same cannot be said about uncountable sets. Among the approaches to define computability in these sets, order-theoretic…
While argument mining has achieved significant success in classifying argumentative relations between statements (support, attack, and neutral), we have a limited computational understanding of logical mechanisms that constitute those…