Related papers: Coalition Formability Semantics with Conflict-Elim…
The compactness theorem for a logic states, roughly, that the satisfiability of a set of well-formed formulas can be determined from the satisfiability of its finite subsets, and vice versa. Usually, proofs of this theorem depend on the…
In Dung-style abstract argumentation, various semantics capture notions of acceptability of arguments. The admissibility semantics capture the notion that an argument can be consistently defended from any potential counterargument. Weak…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
Coalitions are central to politics, including government formation, international relations, and public policy. Coalitions emerge when actors engage one another across multiple relational contexts, but existing literature often approaches…
Competing bimodal coalitions among a group of actors are discussed. First, a model from political sciences is revisited. Most of the model statements are found not to be contained in the model. Second, a new coalition model is built. It…
The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of agents and its coalition ability. We investigate this relation in the standard context of imperfect information concurrent game. We assume that…
Cooperative game theory studies how to allocate the joint value generated by a set of players. These games are typically analyzed using the characteristic function form with transferable utility, which represents the value attainable by…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
Modal logics for reasoning about the power of coalitions capture the notion of effectivity functions associated with game forms. The main goal of coalition logics is to provide formal tools for modeling the dynamics of a game frame whose…
Discounting future costs and rewards is a common practice in accounting, game theory, and machine learning. In spite of this, existing logics for reasoning about strategies with cost and resource constraints do not account for discounting.…
Given a standard myopic dynamic process among coalition structures, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of such structures that is never left once entered through that process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in…
Coalition setting among a set of actors (countries, firms, individuals) is studied using concepts from the theory of spin glasses. Given the distribution of respective bilateral propensities to either cooperation or conflict, the phenomenon…
We present an equilibrium model of politics in which political platforms compete over public opinion. A platform consists of a policy, a coalition of social groups with diverse intrinsic attitudes to policies, and a narrative. We…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…
In formal argumentation, a distinction can be made between extension-based semantics, where sets of arguments are either (jointly) accepted or not, and ranking-based semantics, where grades of acceptability are assigned to arguments.…
We introduce Value Coalition Logic, a typed assignment-based reconstruction of classical coalition logic. The strategic semantics is unchanged: coalitional ability is still interpreted by the standard one-step game-form clause. The change…
The formal study of coalition formation in multi-agent systems is typically realized in the framework of hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this branch of research has been on the existence and the…
An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of…
In many real-life situations that involve exchanges of arguments, individuals may differ on their assessment of which supports between the arguments are in fact justified, i.e., they put forward different support-relations. When confronted…