Related papers: Coalition Formability Semantics with Conflict-Elim…
In the interaction between agents we can have an explicative discourse, when communicating preferences or intentions, and a normative discourse, when considering normative knowledge. For justifying their actions our agents are endowed with…
Game semantics aim at describing the interactive behaviour of proofs by interpreting formulas as games on which proofs induce strategies. In this article, we introduce a game semantics for a fragment of first order propositional logic. One…
We derive a simple mathematical "theory" to show that two decision-making entities can work better together only if at least one of them is occasionally willing to stay neutral. This provides a mathematical "justification" for an age-old…
We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm…
Translations between different nonmonotonic formalisms always have been an important topic in the field, in particular to understand the knowledge-representation capabilities those formalisms offer. We provide such an investigation in terms…
Dung's abstract argumentation framework consists of a set of interacting arguments and a series of semantics for evaluating them. Those semantics partition the powerset of the set of arguments into two classes: extensions and…
The notion of stability in a structured argumentation setup characterizes situations where the acceptance status associated with a given literal will not be impacted by any future evolution of this setup. In this paper, we abstract away…
While reasoning in a logic extending a complete Boolean basis is coNP-hard, restricting to conjunctive fragments of modal languages sometimes allows for tractable reasoning even in the presence of greatest fixpoints. One such example is the…
We use the topology of simplicial complexes to model political structures following [1]. Simplicial complexes are a natural tool to encode interactions in the structures since a simplex can be used to represent a subset of compatible…
Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…
In Cooperative Games with Externalities when the members of a set S \subset N of agents wish to deviate they need to calculate their worth. This worth depends on what the non-members (outsiders) N \setminus S will do, which in turn depends…
We bring forward a logical system of transition algebras that enhances many-sorted first-order logic using features from dynamic logics. The sentences we consider include compositions, unions, and transitive closures of transition…
The rationalizability concept was introduced in \cite{Ber84} and \cite{Pea84} to assess what can be inferred by rational players in a non-cooperative game in the presence of common knowledge. However, this notion can be defined in a number…
The question whether an ontology can safely be replaced by another, possibly simpler, one is fundamental for many ontology engineering and maintenance tasks. It underpins, for example, ontology versioning, ontology modularization,…
In many expert and everyday reasoning contexts it is very useful to reason on the basis of defeasible assumptions. For instance, if the information at hand is incomplete we often use plausible assumptions, or if the information is…
There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but…
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…
We formulate some problems and conjectures about semigroups of rational functions under composition. The considered problems arise in different contexts, but most of them are united by a certain relationship to the concept of amenability.
Coalition formation is a fundamental type of interaction that involves the creation of coherent groupings of distinct, autonomous, agents in order to efficiently achieve their individual or collective goals. Forming effective coalitions is…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…