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We consider two-player games played on weighted directed graphs with mean-payoff and total-payoff objectives, two classical quantitative objectives. While for single-dimensional games the complexity and memory bounds for both objectives…
Partial-monitoring games constitute a mathematical framework for sequential decision making problems with imperfect feedback: The learner repeatedly chooses an action, opponent responds with an outcome, and then the learner suffers a loss…
The paper proposes a natural measure space of zero-sum perfect information games with upper semicontinuous payoffs. Each game is specified by the game tree, and by the assignment of the active player and of the capacity to each node of the…
We study a model of two-player, zero-sum, stopping games with asymmetric information. We assume that the payoff depends on two continuous-time Markov chains (X, Y), where X is only observed by player 1 and Y only by player 2, implying that…
We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs…
Energy games are infinite two-player games played in weighted arenas with quantitative objectives that restrict the consumption of a resource modeled by the weights, e.g., a battery that is charged and drained. Typically, upper and/or lower…
We investigate zero-sum turn-based two-player stochastic games in which the objective of one player is to maximize the amount of rewards obtained during a play, while the other aims at minimizing it. We focus on games in which the minimizer…
We study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games known as \textit{blind stochastic games}, where players neither observe the state nor receive any information about it during the game. A central concept for analyzing long-duration…
In this paper, we investigate a partially observable zero sum games where the state process is a discrete time Markov chain. We consider a general utility function in the optimization criterion. We show the existence of value for both…
In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th…
Probabilistic timed automata are a suitable formalism to model systems with real-time, nondeterministic and probabilistic behaviour. We study two-player zero-sum games on such automata where the objective of the game is specified as the…
Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…
We consider average-energy games, where the goal is to minimize the long-run average of the accumulated energy. While several results have been obtained on these games recently, decidability of average-energy games with a lower-bound…
We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information where the payoff depends on a controlled continuous-time Markov chain X with finite state space which is only observed by player 1. This model was…
This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games,…
We study a model of games that combines concurrency, imperfect information and stochastic aspects. Those are finite states games in which, at each round, the two players choose, simultaneously and independently, an action. Then a successor…
We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract…
Given a family of graphs $\mathcal{F}$, we consider the $\mathcal{F}$-saturation game. In this game two players alternate adding edges to an initially empty graph on $n$ vertices, with the only constraint being that neither player can add…
This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies, admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems…