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Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…

We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the…

Any nonempty, compact, semi-algebraic set in [0, 1] n is the projection of the set of mixed equilibria of a finite game with 2 actions per player on its first n coordinates. A similar result follows for sets of equilibrium payoffs. The…

In this paper we study continuous-time two-player zero-sum optimal switching games on a finite horizon. Using the theory of doubly reflected BSDEs with interconnected barriers, we show that this game has a value and an equilibrium in the…

In mean-payoff games, the objective of the protagonist is to ensure that the limit average of an infinite sequence of numeric weights is nonnegative. In energy games, the objective is to ensure that the running sum of weights is always…

We consider a general class of nonzero-sum $N$-player stochastic games with impulse controls, where players control the underlying dynamics with discrete interventions. We adopt a verification approach and provide sufficient conditions for…

We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…

We consider a non-zero-sum linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) dynamic game with asymmetric information. Each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world $V$, resulting in dependent private observations. We study…

We study in depth the class of games with opacity condition, which are two-player games with imperfect information in which one of the players only has imperfect information, and where the winning condition relies on the information he has…

We consider a zero-sum stochastic game for continuous-time Markov chain with countable state space and unbounded transition and pay-off rates. The additional feature of the game is that the controllers together with taking actions are also…

Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…

We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study structured perfect Bayesian equilibria…

We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…

A basic question for zero-sum repeated games consists in determining whether the mean payoff per time unit is independent of the initial state. In the special case of "zero-player" games, i.e., of Markov chains equipped with additive…

We present polynomial-time algorithms as well as hardness results for equilibrium computation in atomic splittable routing games, for the case of general convex cost functions. These games model traffic in freight transportation, market…

This paper is concerned with a kind of linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) two-person zero-sum stochastic differential game problems with partial observation. We propose the notions of explicit and implicit feedback laws under partial…

We consider a two-player zero-sum game with integral payoff and with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff is chosen among a continuous set of possible payoffs. We prove that the value function of this game is solution of an…

A \emph{bidding} game is played on a graph as follows. A token is placed on an initial vertex and both players are allocated budgets. In each turn, the players simultaneously submit bids that do not exceed their available budgets, the…

Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesizing reactive processes. In the synthesis of stochastic reactive processes, the traditional model is perfect-information stochastic games, where some transitions of the game graph…

Two-player games on graphs are widely studied in formal methods as they model the interaction between a system and its environment. The game is played by moving a token throughout a graph to produce an infinite path. There are several…