Related papers: The Stable Fixtures Problem with Payments
We introduce the concept of attainable sets of payoffs in two-player repeated games with vector payoffs. A set of payoff vectors is called {\em attainable} if player 1 can ensure that there is a finite horizon $T$ such that after time $T$…
We consider a hypergraph (I,C), with possible multiple (hyper)edges and loops, in which the vertices $i\in I$ are interpreted as agents, and the edges $c\in C$ as contracts that can be concluded between agents. The preferences of each agent…
The Stable Marriage Problem, as proposed by Gale and Shapley, considers producing a bipartite matching between two equally sized sets of boys (proposers) and respectively girls (acceptors), each member having a total preference order over…
A fundamental property of choice functions is stability, which, loosely speaking, prescribes that choice sets are invariant under adding and removing unchosen alternatives. We provide several structural insights that improve our…
We consider concurrent mean-payoff games, a very well-studied class of two-player (player 1 vs player 2) zero-sum games on finite-state graphs where every transition is assigned a reward between 0 and 1, and the payoff function is the…
We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…
We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it…
We study the problem of finding Stackelberg equilibria in games with a massive number of players. So far, the only known game instances in which the problem is solved in polynomial time are some particular congestion games. However, a…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
Super-stability is one of the stability concepts in the stable matching problem with ties. It is known that there may not exist a super-stable matching, and the existence of a super-stable matching can be checked in polynomial time. In this…
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the well-known stable matching problem. Teo and Sethuraman proved that, for each instance of the stable roommates problem in a complete graph, there exists a linear inequality…
In this paper we study the computational complexity of computing an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in multi-player symmetric games. For two-player games, deciding existence of an ESS is complete for {\Sigma} 2 , the second level of the…
As Mobility as a Service (MaaS) systems become increasingly popular, travel is changing from unimodal trips to personalized services offered by a platform of mobility operators. Evaluation of MaaS platforms depends on modeling both user…
As a common generalization of previously solved optimization problems concerning bipartite stable matchings, we describe a strongly polynomial network flow based algorithm for computing $\ell$ disjoint stable matchings with minimum total…
We study balanced solutions for network bargaining games with general capacities, where agents can participate in a fixed but arbitrary number of contracts. We provide the first polynomial time algorithm for computing balanced solutions for…
We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more…
We consider multi-player stopping games in continuous time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after all the players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy by observing other…
Multiplayer games on graphs are at the heart of theoretical descriptions of key evolutionary processes that govern vital social and natural systems. However, a comprehensive theoretical framework for solving multiplayer games with an…
Partitioning a large group of employees into teams can prove difficult because unsatisfied employees may want to transfer to other teams. In this case, the team (coalition) formation is unstable and incentivizes deviation from the proposed…
A stable joint plan should guarantee the achievement of a designer's goal in a multi-agent environment, while ensuring that deviations from the prescribed plan would be detected. We present a computational framework where stable joint plans…