Related papers: The Stable Fixtures Problem with Payments
We revisit the problem of existence of stable systems of contracts with arbitrary sets of contracts. We show that stable sets of contracts exists if choices of agents satisfy path-independence. We call such choice functions Plott functions.…
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…
In this paper, we consider a mobility system of travelers and providers, and propose a "mobility game" to study when a traveler is matched to a provider. Each traveler seeks to travel using the services of only one provider, who manages one…
Motivated by understanding non-strict and strict pure strategy equilibria in network anti-coordination games, we define notions of stable and, respectively, strictly stable colorings in graphs. We characterize the cases when such colorings…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…
We use the indirect evolutionary approach to study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in single- and multi-population matching settings, respectively. Players choose strategies to maximize their subjective…
The stable allocation problem is one of the broadest extensions of the well-known stable marriage problem. In an allocation problem, edges of a bipartite graph have capacities and vertices have quotas to fill. Here we investigate the case…
In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated to rooms and have preferences over sets of potential roommates. We study the complexity of finding good allocations of agents to rooms under the assumption that…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
We study a coordination game motivated by the formation of Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), in which agents choose which facilities to join. Joining the same facility as other agents you communicate with has benefits, but different…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…
Let $G = (A \cup B,E)$ be a bipartite graph where the set $A$ consists of agents or main players and the set $B$ consists of jobs or secondary players. Every vertex has a strict ranking of its neighbors. A matching $M$ is popular if for any…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
This paper investigates the long-term behavior of an interacting particle system of interest in the hot topic of evolutionary game theory. Each site of the $d$-dimensional integer lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one…
We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract…
We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph $G$ where every vertex has a capacity and a strict preference order on its neighbors. Furthermore, there is a cost function on the edge set. We assume $G$ admits a perfect matching, i.e.,…
Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…
This paper studies the formation of the grand coalition of a cooperative game by investigating its possible internal dynamics. Each coalition is capable of forcing all players to reconsider the current state of the game when it does not…
I relate bipartite graph matchings to stable matchings. I prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a saturating stable matching, where every agent on one side is matched, for all possible preferences. I extend my…