Related papers: Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information
This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a pair of randomised stopping times to form a saddle point of a zero-sum Dynkin game with partial and/or asymmetric information across players. The framework is non-Markovian and…
We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…
We consider two-player stochastic games played on a finite graph for infinitely many rounds. Stochastic games generalize both Markov decision processes (MDP) by adding an adversary player, and two-player deterministic games by adding…
Stochastic games combine controllable and adversarial non-determinism with stochastic behavior and are a common tool in control, verification and synthesis of reactive systems facing uncertainty. Multi-objective stochastic games are natural…
Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls offer a realistic and far-reaching modelling framework for applications within finance, energy markets, and other areas, but the difficulty in solving such problems has…
In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…
We consider zero-sum games in which players move between adjacent states, where in each pair of adjacent states one state dominates the other. The states in our game can represent positional advantages in physical conflict such as high…
We are interested in the convergence of the value of n-stage games as n goes to infinity and the existence of the uniform value in stochastic games with a general set of states and finite sets of actions where the transition is commutative.…
We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…
In this paper, we investigate dynamic optimization problems featuring both stochastic control and optimal stopping in a finite time horizon. The paper aims to develop new methodologies, which are significantly different from those of mixed…
In this paper, we present an optimal control problem for stochastic differential games under Markov regime-switching forward-backward stochastic differential equations with jumps and partial information. First, we prove a sufficient maximum…
We analyze inertial coordination games: dynamic coordination games with an endogenously changing state that depends on (i) a persistent fundamental players privately learn about over time; and (ii) past play. The speed of learning…
In this paper, we consider finite-strategy approximations of infinite-strategy evolutionary games. We prove that such approximations converge to the true dynamics over finite-time intervals, under mild regularity conditions which are…
We establish existence of nearly-optimal controls, conditions for existence of an optimal control and a saddle-point for respectively a control problem and zero-sum differential game associated with payoff functionals of mean-field type,…
We consider a deterministic mean field games problem in which a typical agent solves an optimal control problem where the dynamics is affine with respect to the control and the cost functional has a growth which is polynomial with respect…
We consider finite horizon stochastic mean field games in which the state space is a network. They are described by a system coupling a backward in time Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and a forward in time Fokker-Planck equation. The…
Stochastic games combine controllable and adversarial non-determinism with stochastic behavior and are a common tool in control, verification and synthesis of reactive systems facing uncertainty. Multi-objective stochastic games are natural…
In this paper, the known deterministic linear-quadratic Stackelberg game is revisited, whose open-loop Stackelberg solution actually possesses the nature of time inconsistency. To handle this time inconsistency, {a two-tier game framework…
Except for special classes of games, there is no systematic framework for analyzing the dynamical properties of multi-agent strategic interactions. Potential games are one such special but restrictive class of games that allow for tractable…
This paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. Let games for some family have common dynamics, running costs and capabilities of players, and let these games differ in densities only. We show that the Dynamic Programming…