Related papers: Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information

A zero-sum two person Perfect Information Stochastic game (PISG) under limiting average payoff has a value and both the maximiser and the minimiser have optimal pure stationary strategies. Firstly we form the matrix of undiscounted payoffs…

In this paper, we consider a differential stochastic zero-sum game in which two players intervene by adopting impulse controls in a finite time horizon. We provide a numerical solution as an approximation of the value function, which turns…

Finding approximate equilibria for large-scale imperfect-information competitive games such as StarCraft, Dota, and CounterStrike remains computationally infeasible due to sparse rewards and challenging exploration over long horizons. In…

We construct an approximate public-signal correlated equilibrium for a nonzero-sum differential game in the class of stochastic strategies with memory. The construction is based on a solution of an auxiliary nonzero-sum continuous-time…

This paper uses recent results on continuous-time finite-horizon optimal switching problems with negative switching costs to prove the existence of a saddle point in an optimal stopping (Dynkin) game. Sufficient conditions for the game's…

In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…

We study the role of costly information in non-cooperative two-player games when an extrinsic third party information broker is introduced asymmetrically, allowing one player to obtain information about the other player's action. This…

We study an infinite-horizon discrete-time optimal stopping problem under non-exponential discounting. A new method, which we call the iterative approach, is developed to find subgame perfect Nash equilibria. When the discount function…

We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the discrete-time exponential-weights dynamic with a constant step size on all general-sum and symmetric $2 \times 2$ normal-form games, i.e. games with $2$ pure strategies per player, and where the…

In this paper we analyse a dynamic model of investment under uncertainty in a duopoly, in which each firm has an option to switch from the present market to a new market. We construct a subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies and…

We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…

We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of…

We formulate and analyze game-theoretic problems for systems governed by integral equations. For Volterra integral equations, we obtain and prove necessary and sufficient conditions for linear-quadratic problems, and for problems that are…

While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…

We consider mean field games with discrete state spaces (called discrete mean field games in the following) and we analyze these games in continuous and discrete time, over finite as well as infinite time horizons. We prove the existence of…

This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…

This paper studies the implementation of Bayes correlated equilibria in symmetric Bayesian games with nonatomic players, using direct information structures and obedient strategies. The main results demonstrate full implementation in a…

Decomposition, i.e. independently analyzing possible subgames, has proven to be an essential principle for effective decision-making in perfect information games. However, in imperfect information games, decomposition has proven to be…

We consider static finite-player network games and their continuum analogs, graphon games. Existence and uniqueness results are provided, as well as convergence of the finite-player network game optimal strategy profiles to their analogs…

We study stochastic zero-sum games on graphs, which are prevalent tools to model decision-making in presence of an antagonistic opponent in a random environment. In this setting, an important question is the one of strategy complexity: what…