Related papers: Timeability of Extensive-Form Games

We present a robust framework with computational algorithms to support decision makers in sequential games. Our framework includes methods to solve games with complete information, assess the robustness of such solutions and, finally,…

We consider two-player games over graphs and give tight bounds on the memory size of strategies ensuring safety objectives. More specifically, we show that the minimal number of memory states of a strategy ensuring a safety objective is…

Real-time cybersecurity and privacy applications require reliable verification methods and system design tools to ensure their correctness. Many of these reactive real-time applications embedded in various infrastructures, such as airports,…

We introduce a simple extensive-form algorithm for finding equilibria of two-player, zero-sum games. The algorithm is realization equivalent to a generalized form of Fictitious Play. We compare its performance to that of a similar…

Delay games are two-player games of infinite duration in which one player may delay her moves to obtain a lookahead on her opponent's moves. For $\omega$-regular winning conditions it is known that such games can be solved in…

Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…

We generalize a concept of classical finite extensive game to make it useful for application of quantum objects. The generalization extends a quantum realization scheme of static games to any finite extensive game. It represents an…

Attack--defense trees are used to describe security weaknesses of a system and possible countermeasures. In this paper, the connection between attack--defense trees and game theory is made explicit. We show that attack--defense trees and…

We consider an extension of the classical Total Store Order (TSO) semantics by expanding it to turn-based 2-player safety games. During her turn, a player can select any of the communicating processes and perform its next transition. We…

We consider games played on the transition graph of concurrent programs running under the Total Store Order (TSO) weak memory model. Games are frequently used to model the interaction between a system and its environment, in this case…

The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…

We consider games played on the transtion graph of concurrent programs running under the Total Store Order (TSO) weak memory model. Games are frequently used to model the interaction between a system and its environment, in this case…

Many learning algorithms are known to converge to an equilibrium for specific classes of games if the same learning algorithm is adopted by all agents. However, when the agents are self-interested, a natural question is whether agents have…

In the literature of game theory, the information sets of extensive form games have different interpretations, which may lead to confusions and paradoxical cases. We argue that the problem lies in the mix-up of two interpretations of the…

Graph games of infinite length are a natural model for open reactive processes: one player represents the controller, trying to ensure a given specification, and the other represents a hostile environment. The evolution of the system…

Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy…

Securing dynamic networks against adversarial actions is challenging because of the need to anticipate and counter strategic disruptions by adversarial entities within complex network structures. Traditional game-theoretic models, while…

Games on graphs provide a natural and powerful model for reactive systems. In this paper, we consider generalized reachability objectives, defined as conjunctions of reachability objectives. We first prove that deciding the winner in such…

Sequential equilibrium is one of the most fundamental refinements of Nash equilibrium for games in extensive form. However, it is not defined for extensive-form games in which a player can choose among a continuum of actions. We define a…

Deception plays critical roles in economics and technology, especially in emerging interactions in cyberspace. Holistic models of deception are needed in order to analyze interactions and to design mechanisms that improve them. Game theory…