Related papers: Timeability of Extensive-Form Games
Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…
We show open games cover extensive form games with both perfect and imperfect information. Doing so forces us to address two current weaknesses in open games: the lack of a notion of player and their agency within open games, and the lack…
Recent advancements in algorithms for sequential decision-making under imperfect information have shown remarkable success in large games such as limit- and no-limit poker. These algorithms traditionally formalize the games using the…
We extend Kuhn's Theorem to games of the extensive form with unawareness. We prove that if a game of the extensive form with unawareness has perfect recall, then for each mixed strategy there is an equivalent behavior strategy. We show that…
A valuation for a player in a game in extensive form is an assignment of numeric values to the players moves. The valuation reflects the desirability moves. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the highest valuation.…
Escalation in games is when agents keep playing forever. Based on formal proofs we claim that if agents assume that resource are infinite, escalation is rational.
We develop methods to formally describe and compare games, in order to probe questions of game structure and design, and as a stepping stone to predicting player behavior from design patterns. We define a grammar-like formalism to describe…
Extensive games are tools largely used in economics to describe decision processes ofa community of agents. In this paper we propose a formal presentation based on theproof assistant COQ which focuses mostly on infinite extensive games and…
We argue that the extensive-form game (EFG) model isn't powerful enough to express all important aspects of imperfect information games, such as those related to decomposition and online game solving. We present a principled attempt to fix…
Imperfect-recall games, in which players may forget previously acquired information, have found many practical applications, ranging from game abstractions to team games and testing AI agents. In this paper, we quantify the utility gain by…
We identify a subtle security issue that impacts mechanism design in scenarios in which agents can absolutely commit to strategies. Absolute commitments allow the strategy of an agent to depend on the commitments made by the other agents.…
For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler…
Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important game-theoretic model that allows a compact representation of strategies in dynamic strategic interactions. Practical use of imperfect recall games is limited due to negative…
We present a simple game model where agents with different memory lengths compete for finite resources. We show by simulation and analytically that an instability exists at a critical memory length, and as a result, different memory lengths…
Empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) is a general framework for reasoning about complex games using agent-based simulation. Data from simulating select strategy profiles is employed to estimate a cogent and tractable game model…
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL*) is a central logic for multiagent systems. Its extension to the imperfect information setting (ATL*i ) is well known to have an undecidable model-checking problem when agents have perfect recall.…
The field of Game Theory provides a useful mechanism for modeling many decision-making scenarios. In participating in these scenarios individuals and groups adopt particular strategies, which generally perform with varying levels of…
Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…
We define a new concept of "mistake" strategies and actions for strategic-form and extensive-form games, analyze the relationship to prior main game-theoretic solution concepts, study algorithms for computation, and explore practicality.…
We study the long-term behavior of the fictitious play process in repeated extensive-form games of imperfect information with perfect recall. Each player maintains incorrect beliefs that the moves at all information sets, except the one at…