Related papers: On Uniform Tauberian Theorems for Dynamic Games

Here, we study the existence and the convergence of solutions for the vanishing discount MFG problem with a quadratic Hamiltonian. We give conditions under which the discounted problem has a unique classical solution and prove convergence…

While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the constraints that optimal solutions need to satisfy, and…

Mertens [In Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians (Berkeley, Calif., 1986) (1987) 1528-1577 Amer. Math. Soc.] proposed two general conjectures about repeated games: the first one is that, in any two-person zero-sum…

We consider two-player games played on weighted directed graphs with mean-payoff and total-payoff objectives, two classical quantitative objectives. While for single-dimensional games the complexity and memory bounds for both objectives…

The paper deals with a zero-sum differential game in which the dynamical system is described by a fractional differential equation with the Caputo derivative of an order $\alpha \in (0, 1).$ The goal of the first (second) player is to…

In several standard models of dynamic programming (gambling houses, MDPs, POMDPs), we prove the existence of a very robust notion of value for the infinitely repeated problem, namely the pathwise uniform value. This solves two open…

We study stationary mean field games with singular controls in which the representative player interacts with a long-time weighted average of the population through a discounted and an ergodic performance criterion. This class of games…

The equivalence between von Neumann's Minimax Theorem for zero-sum games and the LP Duality Theorem connects cornerstone problems of the two fields of game theory and optimization, respectively, and has been the subject of intense scrutiny…

In the present paper, we study a two-player zero-sum deterministic differential game with both players adopting impulse controls, in infinite time horizon, under rather weak assumptions on the cost functions. We prove by means of the…

Mertens, Neyman and Rosenberg [MOR, 2009] used the Mertens and Neyman theorem [IJGT, 1981] to prove the existence of uniform value for absorbing games with finite state space and compact action sets. We provide an analogous proof for…

We consider a dynamic programming problem with arbitrary state space and bounded rewards. Is it possible to define in an unique way a limit value for the problem, where the "patience" of the decision-maker tends to infinity ? We consider,…

This paper investigates value function approximation in the context of zero-sum Markov games, which can be viewed as a generalization of the Markov decision process (MDP) framework to the two-agent case. We generalize error bounds from MDPs…

In this paper, we consider the social optimal problem of discrete time finite state space mean field games (referred to as finite mean field games [1]). Unlike the individual optimization of their own cost function in competitive models, in…

The concept of a classical player, corresponding to a classical random variable, is extended to include quantum random variables in the form of self adjoint operators on infinite dimensional Hilbert space. A quantum version of Von Neumann's…

We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information where the payoff depends on a controlled continuous-time Markov chain X with finite state space which is only observed by player 1. This model was…

In this paper we study mean field games with possibly multiple mean field equilibria. Instead of focusing on the individual equilibria, we propose to study the set of values over all possible equilibria, which we call the set value of the…

We analyze the convergence properties of the two-timescale fictitious play combining the classical fictitious play with the Q-learning for two-player zero-sum stochastic games with player-dependent learning rates. We show its almost sure…

This paper uses value functions to characterize the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of an arbitrary, possibly infinite-horizon game. It specifies the game's extensive form as a pentaform (Streufert 2023p, arXiv:2107.10801v4), which…

This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…

We present a modified version of the two-player "tug-of-war" game introduced by Peres, Schramm, Sheffield, and Wilson. This new tug-of-war game is identical to the original except near the boundary of the domain $\partial \Omega$, but its…