Related papers: On Uniform Tauberian Theorems for Dynamic Games

For two-person dynamic zero-sum games (both discrete and continuous settings), we investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity and the limit of value…

This paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. Let games for some family have common dynamics, running costs and capabilities of players, and let these games differ in densities only. We show that the Dynamic Programming…

The paper is devoted to dynamic games. We consider a general enough framework, which is not limited to e.g. differential games and could accommodate both discrete and continuous time. Assuming common dynamics, we study two game families…

The paper is concerned with two-person games with saddle point. We investigate the limits of value functions for long-time-average payoff, discounted average payoff, and the payoff that follows a probability density. Most of our assumptions…

The paper is devoted to the asymptotic behavior of value functions of abstract control problem with the long-time and discounted averages. The Uniform Tauberian Theorem for these problems states that the uniform convergence of value…

We study two-player zero-sum recursive games with a countable state space and finite action spaces at each state. When the family of $n$-stage values $\{v_n,n\geq 1\}$ is totally bounded for the uniform norm, we prove the existence of the…

We prove a Tauberian theorem for nonexpansive operators, and apply it to the model of zero-sum stochastic game. Under mild assumptions, we prove that the value of the lambda-discounted game v_{lambda} converges uniformly when lambda goes to…

This paper proves several Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators, and provides two applications to zero-sum stochastic games where the total payoff is a weighted sum of the stage payoffs. The first application is to provide…

In an optimal control framework, we consider the value $V_T(x)$ of the problem starting from state $x$ with finite horizon $T$, as well as the value $V_\lambda(x)$ of the $\lambda$-discounted problem starting from $x$. We prove that uniform…

We study the ergodicity of deterministic two-person zero-sum differential games. This property is defined by the uniform convergence to a constant of either the infinite-horizon discounted value as the discount factor tends to zero, or…

This paper extends Berge's maximum theorem for possibly noncompact action sets and unbounded cost functions to minimax problems and studies applications of these extensions to two-player zero-sum games with possibly noncompact action sets…

We prove in a dynamic programming framework that uniform convergence of the finite horizon values implies that asymptotically the average accumulated payoff is constant on optimal trajectories. We analyze and discuss several possible…

This paper investigates the two-person zero-sum stochastic games for piece-wise deterministic Markov decision processes with risk-sensitive finite-horizon cost criterion on a general state space. Here, the transition and cost/reward rates…

This paper concerns value functions of time-dependent tug-of-war games. We first prove the existence and uniqueness of value functions and verify that these game values satisfy a dynamic programming principle. Using the arguments in the…

Turn-based discounted-sum games are two-player zero-sum games played on finite directed graphs. The vertices of the graph are partitioned between player 1 and player 2. Plays are infinite walks on the graph where the next vertex is decided…

This paper develops an algorithm for upper- and lower-bounding the value function for a class of linear time-varying games subject to convex control sets. In particular, a two-player zero-sum differential game is considered where the…

We study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games known as \textit{blind stochastic games}, where players neither observe the state nor receive any information about it during the game. A central concept for analyzing long-duration…

We consider stochastic differential games with $N$ nearly identical players, linear-Gaussian dynamics, and infinite horizon discounted quadratic cost. Admissible controls are feedbacks for which the system is ergodic. We first study the…

We consider a two-player zero-sum deterministic differential game where each player uses both continuous and impulse controls in infinite-time horizon. We assume that the impulses supposed to be of general term and the costs depend on the…

In this paper, we formulate a two-player zero-sum game under dynamic constraints defined by hybrid dynamical equations. The game consists of a min-max problem involving a cost functional that depends on the actions and resulting solutions…