On the Heterogeneity of Independent Learning Dynamics in Zero-sum Stochastic Games
Optimization and Control
2022-04-05 v2 Computer Science and Game Theory
Dynamical Systems
Abstract
We analyze the convergence properties of the two-timescale fictitious play combining the classical fictitious play with the Q-learning for two-player zero-sum stochastic games with player-dependent learning rates. We show its almost sure convergence under the standard assumptions in two-timescale stochastic approximation methods when the discount factor is less than the product of the ratios of player-dependent step sizes. To this end, we formulate a novel Lyapunov function formulation and present a one-sided asynchronous convergence result.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2112.06181,
title = {On the Heterogeneity of Independent Learning Dynamics in Zero-sum Stochastic Games},
author = {Muhammed O. Sayin and K. Alperen Cetiner},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.06181},
year = {2022}
}
Comments
Extended version