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On the Heterogeneity of Independent Learning Dynamics in Zero-sum Stochastic Games

Optimization and Control 2022-04-05 v2 Computer Science and Game Theory Dynamical Systems

Abstract

We analyze the convergence properties of the two-timescale fictitious play combining the classical fictitious play with the Q-learning for two-player zero-sum stochastic games with player-dependent learning rates. We show its almost sure convergence under the standard assumptions in two-timescale stochastic approximation methods when the discount factor is less than the product of the ratios of player-dependent step sizes. To this end, we formulate a novel Lyapunov function formulation and present a one-sided asynchronous convergence result.

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Cite

@article{arxiv.2112.06181,
  title  = {On the Heterogeneity of Independent Learning Dynamics in Zero-sum Stochastic Games},
  author = {Muhammed O. Sayin and K. Alperen Cetiner},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.06181},
  year   = {2022}
}

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