Related papers: On Uniform Tauberian Theorems for Dynamic Games
We consider a general nonzero-sum impulse game with two players. The main mathematical contribution of the paper is a verification theorem which provides, under some regularity conditions, a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities…
A two-person zero-sum infinite dimensional differential game of infinite duration with discounted payoff involving hybrid controls is studied. The minimizing player is allowed to take continuous, switching and impulse controls whereas the…
We study the existence of different notions of value in two-person zero-sum repeated games where the state evolves and players receive signals. We provide some examples showing that the limsup value (and the uniform value) may not exist in…
This paper considers a class of two-player zero-sum games on directed graphs whose vertices are equipped with random payoffs of bounded support known by both players. Starting from a fixed vertex, players take turns to move a token along…
We study a class of deterministic mean field games and related optimal control problems, with a finite time horizon and in which the state space is a network. An agent controls her velocity, and, when she occupies a vertex, she can either…
Reinforcement learning has been successful both empirically and theoretically in single-agent settings, but extending these results to multi-agent reinforcement learning in general-sum Markov games remains challenging. This paper studies…
We study two-player zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff function is tail measurable (and not necessarily the long-run average payoff). We show that the maxmin value equals the concavification of…
Strategic-form min-max game theory examines the existence, multiplicity, selection of equilibria, and the worst-case computational complexity under perfect rationality. However, in many applications, games are drawn from an ensemble, and…
This paper investigates the discrete-time asynchronous games in which noncooperative agents seek to minimize their individual cost functions. Building on the assumption of partial asynchronism, i.e., each agent updates at least once within…
In this paper, we are concerned with game-theoretic interpretations to the following oblique derivative boundary value problem \begin{align*} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \Delta_{p}^{N}u=0 & \textrm{in $ \Omega$,}\\ \langle \beta , Du \rangle…
We consider a finite-horizon, zero-sum game in which both players control a stochastic differential equation by invoking impulses. We derive a control randomization formulation of the game and use the existence of a value for the randomized…
We study zero-sum games in the space of probability distributions over the Euclidean space $\mathbb{R}^d$ with entropy regularization, in the setting when the interaction function between the players is smooth and strongly convex-strongly…
We show, under weaker assumptions than in the previous literature, that a perpetual optimal stopping game always has a value. We also show that there exists an optimal stopping time for the seller, but not necessarily for the buyer.…
The paper is concerned with a variant of the continuous-time finite state Markov game of control and stopping where both players can affect transition rates, while only one player can choose a stopping time. We use the dynamic programming…
We consider a two-player zero-sum game with integral payoff and with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff is chosen among a continuous set of possible payoffs. We prove that the value function of this game is solution of an…
In a two-player zero-sum graph game the players move a token throughout a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner or payoff of the game. Traditionally, the players alternate turns in moving the token. In {\em bidding…
Dynamic games arise when multiple agents with differing objectives choose control inputs to a dynamic system. Dynamic games model a wide variety of applications in economics, defense, and energy systems. However, compared to single-agent…
Zero-sum mean payoff games can be studied by means of a nonlinear spectral problem. When the state space is finite, the latter consists in finding an eigenpair $(u,\lambda)$ solution of $T(u)=\lambda \mathbf{1} + u$ where $T:\mathbb{R}^n…
Most existing results about \emph{last-iterate convergence} of learning dynamics are limited to two-player zero-sum games, and only apply under rigid assumptions about what dynamics the players follow. In this paper we provide new results…
Risk-aversion and bounded rationality are two key characteristics of human decision-making. Risk-averse quantal-response equilibrium (RQE) is a solution concept that incorporates these features, providing a more realistic depiction of human…