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In this paper, we consider a network of consumers who are under the combined influence of their neighbors and external influencing entities (the marketers). The consumers' opinion follows a hybrid dynamics whose opinion jumps are due to the…

Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of $m$ candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m$ candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on…

The task of computing approximate Nash equilibria in large zero-sum extensive-form games has received a tremendous amount of attention due mainly to the Annual Computer Poker Competition. Immediately after its inception, two competing and…

I study symmetric competitions in which each player chooses an arbitrary distribution over a one-dimensional performance index, subject to a convex cost. I establish existence of a symmetric equilibrium, document various properties it must…

We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…

I study collective dynamic information acquisition. Players decide when to stop sequential sampling via a collective stopping rule, which specifies decisive coalitions that can terminate information acquisition upon agreement. I develop a…

We study the election control problem with multi-votes, where each voter can present a single vote according different views (or layers, we use "layer" to represent "view"). For example, according to the attributes of candidates, such as:…

This paper investigates an infinite-horizon problems in the one-dimensional calculus of variations, arising from the Ramsey model of endogeneous economic growth. Following Chichilnisky, we introduce an additional term, which models concern…

Solution methods for generalized Nash equilibrium have been dominated by variational inequalities and complementarity problems. Since these approaches fundamentally rely on the sufficiency of first-order optimality conditions for the…

We introduce a new methodology that enables detection of the onset of convergence towards Nash equilibria in simple repeated games with infinitely large strategy spaces, thereby revealing the heuristics used in decision-making. The method…

We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…

We construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control with absorption, arising from a stylized model for corporate finance. More precisely, the paper focusses on a strategic dynamic…

We study a recommendation system where sellers compete for visibility by strategically offering commissions to a platform that optimally curates a ranked menu of items and their respective prices for each customer. Customers interact…

We construct Nash-equilibria in mean-field portfolio games of optimal investment and hedging under relative performance concerns with exponential (CARA) utility preferences. Common noise dynamics are modeled by integer-valued random…

We consider the problem of modeling competitive diffusion in real world social networks via the notion of ChoiceGAPs which combine choice logic programs due to Sacca` and Zaniolo and Generalized Annotated Programs due to Kifer and…

This paper tackles the problem of adversarial examples from a game theoretic point of view. We study the open question of the existence of mixed Nash equilibria in the zero-sum game formed by the attacker and the classifier. While previous…

We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable'" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which…

The Adjusted Winner procedure is an important fair division mechanism proposed by Brams and Taylor for allocating goods between two parties. It has been used in practice for divorce settlements and analyzing political disputes. Assuming…

This article extends the analysis of Atkinson, Foley, and Ganz in "Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked-Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?". Their work uses a one-dimensional spatial model based on survey data from…

We consider the existence and computational complexity of coalitional stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts represent a natural and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent approach termed partition equilibrium. We…