English

Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete Votes

Computer Science and Game Theory 2024-09-30 v2 Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of mm candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about t<mt < m candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on specific instances of this problem, our paper fully characterizes the set of positional scoring rules that can be computed for any 1t<m1 \leq t < m, which, notably, does not include plurality. We then extend this to show a similar impossibility result for single transferable vote (elimination voting). These negative results are information-theoretic and agnostic to the number of queries. Finally, for scoring rules that are computable with limited-sized queries, we give parameterized upper and lower bounds on the number of such queries a deterministic or randomized algorithm must make to determine the score-maximizing candidate. While there is no gap between our bounds for deterministic algorithms, identifying the exact query complexity for randomized algorithms is a challenging open problem, of which we solve one special case.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2402.11104,
  title  = {Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete Votes},
  author = {Daniel Halpern and Safwan Hossain and Jamie Tucker-Foltz},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.11104},
  year   = {2024}
}
R2 v1 2026-06-28T14:51:29.964Z