Allocating marketing resources over social networks: A long-term analysis
Abstract
In this paper, we consider a network of consumers who are under the combined influence of their neighbors and external influencing entities (the marketers). The consumers' opinion follows a hybrid dynamics whose opinion jumps are due to the marketing campaigns. By using the relevant static game model proposed recently in [1], we prove that although the marketers are in competition and therefore create tension in the network, the network reaches a consensus. Exploiting this key result, we propose a coopetition marketing strategy which combines the one-shot Nash equilibrium actions and a policy of no advertising. Under reasonable sufficient conditions, it is proved that the proposed coopetition strategy profile Pareto-dominates the one-shot Nash equilibrium strategy. This is a very encouraging result to tackle the much more challenging problem of designing Pareto-optimal and equilibrium strategies for the considered dynamical marketing game.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2011.09268,
title = {Allocating marketing resources over social networks: A long-term analysis},
author = {Vineeth S. Varma and Samson Lasaulce and Julien Mounthanyvong and Irinel-Constantin Morarescu},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.09268},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
IEEE Control Systems Letters Vol. 5, No. 6, pp. 3224-3229, April 2019