Information Revelation in Constant-Sum Games: Elections and Beyond
Abstract
We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable'" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which office-motivated candidates possess private information about policy consequences. The ex-post property implies a sharp bound on information aggregation: equilibrium voter welfare is at best equal to the efficient use of a single candidate's information. In canonical specifications, politicians may "anti-pander" (overreact to their information), whereas some degree of pandering would be socially beneficial. We discuss other applications of the ex-post result.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2406.17084,
title = {Information Revelation in Constant-Sum Games: Elections and Beyond},
author = {Navin Kartik and Francesco Squintani and Katrin Tinn},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.17084},
year = {2025}
}
Comments
Earlier versions of this paper were circulated, and posted on arXiv, under the title "Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections"