Well-Founded Extensive Games with Perfect Information
Computer Science and Game Theory
2021-06-23 v1
Abstract
We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations for two classes of these games in which subgame perfect equilibria exist: two-player zero-sum games with, respectively, two and three outcomes.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2106.11491,
title = {Well-Founded Extensive Games with Perfect Information},
author = {Krzysztof R. Apt and Sunil Simon},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2106.11491},
year = {2021}
}
Comments
In Proceedings TARK 2021, arXiv:2106.10886