Random Extensive Form Games and its Application to Bargaining
Computer Science and Game Theory
2015-09-09 v1
Abstract
We consider two-player random extensive form games where the payoffs at the leaves are independently drawn uniformly at random from a given feasible set C. We study the asymptotic distribution of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for binary-trees with increasing depth in various random (or deterministic) assignments of players to nodes. We characterize the assignments under which the asymptotic distribution concentrates around a point. Our analysis provides a natural way to derive from the asymptotic distribution a novel solution concept for two-player bargaining problems with a solid strategic justification.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1509.02337,
title = {Random Extensive Form Games and its Application to Bargaining},
author = {Itai Arieli and Yakov Babichenko},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1509.02337},
year = {2015}
}