Related papers: Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting
In the classic cake-cutting problem (Steinhaus, 1948), a heterogeneous resource has to be divided among n agents with different valuations in a proportional way --- giving each agent a piece with a value of at least 1/n of the total. In…
Envy-free cake-cutting protocols procedurally divide an infinitely divisible good among a set of agents so that no agent prefers another's allocation to their own. These protocols are highly complex and difficult to prove correct. Recently,…
A truthful mechanism for a Bayesian single-item auction results with some ex-ante revenue for the seller, and some ex-ante total surplus for the buyers. We study the Pareto frontier of the set of seller-buyers ex-ante utilities, generated…
We consider the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents with possibly different weights, aiming for a solution that is both fair and efficient. Specifically, we focus on the classic fairness notion of proportionality…
Given a set of $p$ players we consider problems concerning envy-free allocation of collections of $k$ pieces from a given set of goods or chores. We show that if $p\le n$ and each player can choose $k$ pieces out of $n$ pieces of a cake,…
Fair division with unequal shares is an intensively studied recourse allocation problem. For $ i\in [n] $, let $ \mu_i $ be an atomless probability measure on the measurable space $(C,\mathcal{S}) $ and let $ t_i $ be positive numbers…
This paper studies a sale promotion mechanism design problem on a social network, where a node (a seller) sells one item to the other nodes on the network to maximize her revenue. However, the seller does not know other nodes except for her…
Behavioural economists have shown that people are often averse to inequality and will make choices to avoid unequal outcomes. In this paper, we consider how to allocate indivisible goods fairly so as to minimize inequality. We consider how…
We study the monotonicity properties of solutions in the classic problem of fair cake-cutting --- dividing a heterogeneous resource among agents with different preferences. Resource- and population-monotonicity relate to scenarios where the…
This paper proposes a cake-cutting protocol using cryptography when the cake is a heterogeneous good that is represented by an interval on a real line. Although the Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol with one knife achieves simple…
We study a monopolistic insurance market with hidden information, where the agent's type $\theta$ is private information that is unobservable to the insurer, and it is drawn from a continuum of types. The hidden type affects both the loss…
Cake-cutting protocols aim at dividing a ``cake'' (i.e., a divisible resource) and assigning the resulting portions to several players in a way that each of the players feels to have received a ``fair'' amount of the cake. An important…
We consider Steinhaus cake dividing game.
Shortlisting is a common and effective method for pre-selecting participants in competitive settings. To ensure fairness, a cut-off score is typically announced, allowing only contestants who exceed it to enter the contest, while others are…
We study the classic problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous and divisible resource -- represented by a cake, $[0,1]$ -- among $n$ agents. This work considers an interesting variant of the problem where agents are embedded on a graph.…
We consider active learning under incentive compatibility constraints. The main application of our results is to economic experiments, in which a learner seeks to infer the parameters of a subject's preferences: for example their attitudes…
We study stochastic two-player turn-based games in which the objective of one player is to ensure several infinite-horizon total reward objectives, while the other player attempts to spoil at least one of the objectives. The games have…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a divisible resource in the form of a graph, also known as graphical cake cutting. Unlike for the canonical interval cake, a connected envy-free allocation is not guaranteed to exist for a graphical…
We introduce a graphical framework for fair division in cake cutting, where comparisons between agents are limited by an underlying network structure. We generalize the classical fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality to this…
We consider the problem of dividing items between individuals in a way that is fair both in the sense of distributional fairness and in the sense of not having disparate impact across protected classes. An important existing mechanism for…