Related papers: Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games
We study the complexity of equilibrium computation in discrete preference games. These games were introduced by Chierichetti, Kleinberg, and Oren (EC '13, JCSS '18) to model decision-making by agents in a social network that choose a…
A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (non-negative) weights of the "yea" voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum,…
We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…
Quantum computing has the potential to solve complex problems faster and more efficiently than classical computing. It can achieve speedups by leveraging quantum phenomena like superposition, entanglement, and tunneling. Quantum walks (QWs)…
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show…
Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko (2011) have introduced three hierarchies for simple games in order to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of (roughly) weighted voting games. Their third class $\mathcal{C}_\alpha$…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…
This paper considers the decidability of fully quantum nonlocal games with noisy maximally entangled states. Fully quantum nonlocal games are a generalization of nonlocal games, where both questions and answers are quantum and the referee…
Computing Nash equilibrium in multi-agent games is a longstanding challenge at the interface of game theory and computer science. It is well known that a general normal form game in N players and k strategies requires exponential space…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
This paper addresses one of the most challenging issues in designing an efficient and sustainable ridesharing service: ridesharing market design. We formulate it as a fair cost allocation problem through the lens of the cooperative game…
An important problem in computational social choice theory is the complexity of undesirable behavior among agents, such as control, manipulation, and bribery in election systems. These kinds of voting strategies are often tempting at the…
Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) is an NP-Hard problem in which agents are partitioned into mutually exclusive groups to maximize their social welfare. In this work, we propose QuACS, a novel hybrid quantum classical algorithm for…
Online bipartite matching is a fundamental problem in online algorithms. The goal is to match two sets of vertices to maximize the sum of the edge weights, where for one set of vertices, each vertex and its corresponding edge weights appear…
This paper investigates repeated win-lose coordination games (WLC-games). We analyse which protocols are optimal for these games, covering both the worst case and average case scenarios, i,e., optimizing the guaranteed and expected…
This paper provides a serious attempt towards constructing a switching-algebraic theory for weighted monotone voting systems, whether they are scalar-weighted or vector-weighted. The paper concentrates on the computation of a prominent…
Shortlisting of candidates--selecting a group of "best" candidates--is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps…
Partitioning a set of $n$ items or agents while maximizing the value of the partition is a fundamental algorithmic task. We study this problem in the specific setting of maximizing social welfare in additively separable hedonic games.…
Coalition formation is a key topic in multi-agent systems. Coalitions enable agents to achieve goals that they may not have been able to achieve on their own. Previous work has shown problems in coalitional games to be computationally hard.…
Cooperative games with nonempty core are called balanced, and the set of balanced games is a polyhedron. Given a game with empty core, we look for the closest balanced game, in the sense of the (weighted) Euclidean distance, i.e., the…