Related papers: Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games
The Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index and other voting power indices measure the importance of a player in a coalitional game. We consider a simple coalitional game called the spanning connectivity game (SCG) based on an undirected,…
We introduce partitioned matching games as a suitable model for international kidney exchange programmes, where in each round the total number of available kidney transplants needs to be distributed amongst the participating countries in a…
Multi-winner approval voting selects a size-$k$ committee that aggregates voters' approval preferences over a set of alternatives. A central question is coalitional stability: No coalition should be able to pick a committee -- of size at…
It is well-known that the winning region of a parity game with $n$ nodes and $k$ priorities can be computed as a $k$-nested fixpoint of a suitable function; straightforward computation of this nested fixpoint requires…
In social choice there often arises a conflict between the majority principle (the search for a candidate that is as good as possible for as many voters as possible), and the protection of minority rights (choosing a candidate that is not…
Let $V$ be a multiset of $n$ points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, which we call voters, and let $k\geq 1$ and $\ell\geq 1$ be two given constants. We consider the following game, where two players $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ compete over the…
We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…
Quantum games have attracted much attention in recent years due to their ability to solve decision-making dilemmas. The aim of this study is to extend previous work on quantum games by introducing a Mathematica package QEGS (Quantum…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
The UNIQUE GAMES problem is a central problem in algorithms and complexity theory. Given an instance of UNIQUE GAMES, the STRONG UNIQUE GAMES problem asks to find the largest subset of vertices, such that the UNIQUE GAMES instance induced…
We study the computational complexity of an important property of simple, regular and weighted games, which is decisiveness. We show that this concept can naturally be represented in the context of hypergraph theory, and that decisiveness…
We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…
Weighted timed games are zero-sum games played by two players on a timed automaton equipped with weights, where one player wants to minimise the accumulated weight while reaching a target. Weighted timed games are notoriously difficult and…
Energy games belong to a class of turn-based two-player infinite-duration games}played on a weighted directed graph. It is one of the rare and intriguing combinatorial problems that lie in ${\sf NP} \cap {\sf co\mbox{-}NP}$, but are not…
Capacitated network bargaining games are popular combinatorial games that involve the structure of matchings in graphs. We show that it is always possible to stabilize unit-weight instances of this problem (that is, ensure that they admit a…
We use simplicial complexes to model simple games as well as weighted voting games where certain coalitions are considered impossible. Topological characterizations of various ideas from simple games are provided, as are the expressions for…
We study the problem of finding Stackelberg equilibria in games with a massive number of players. So far, the only known game instances in which the problem is solved in polynomial time are some particular congestion games. However, a…
The assumption that voters' preferences share some common structure is a standard way to circumvent NP-hardness results in social choice problems. While the Kemeny ranking problem is NP-hard in the general case, it is known to become easy…
We consider the problems of weighted constrained sampling and weighted model counting, where we are given a propositional formula and a weight for each world. The first problem consists of sampling worlds with a probability proportional to…
Power indices are essential in assessing the contribution and influence of individual agents in multi-agent systems, providing crucial insights into collaborative dynamics and decision-making processes. While invaluable, traditional…