Obvious Independence of Clones
Abstract
The Independence of Clones (IoC) criterion measures a voting rule's robustness to strategic nomination. Prior literature has established empirically that individuals may still submit costly, distortionary misreports even in strategy-proof (SP) settings, due to failure to recognize the SP property. The intersection of these issues motivates the search for mechanisms that are Obviously Independent of Clones (OIoC): where strategic nomination/exiting of clones obviously has no effect on the outcome. We construct a formal and intuitive definition of a voting rule being OIoC and examine five IoC rules to identify whether they satisfy OIoC.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2210.04880,
title = {Obvious Independence of Clones},
author = {Ratip Emin Berker and Sílvia Casacuberta and Christopher Ong and Isaac Robinson},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.04880},
year = {2025}
}
Comments
Extended abstract presented in the 4th International Workshop on Democracy and AI (DemocrAI 2024) at IJCAI-24. Workshop proceedings published ("Artificial Intelligence for Research and Democracy") by Springer Nature. For our follow-up work on this topic, see "From Independence of Clones to Composition Consistency: A Hierarchy of Barriers to Strategic Nomination" by Berker et al. 2025