Related papers: Obvious Independence of Clones
We study two axioms for social choice functions that capture the impact of similar candidates: independence of clones (IoC) and composition consistency (CC). We clarify the relationship between these axioms by observing that CC is strictly…
In an ordinal election, two candidates are said to be perfect clones if every voter ranks them adjacently. The independence of clones axiom then states that removing one of the two clones should not change the election outcome. This axiom…
We propose a Condorcet consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods satisfying the anti-vote-splitting criterion of independence of clones. In this family, only Split…
A perfect clone in an ordinal election (i.e., an election where the voters rank the candidates in a strict linear order) is a set of candidates that each voter ranks consecutively. We consider different relaxations of this notion:…
Classical results in voting theory show that strategic manipulation by voters is inevitable if a voting rule simultaneously satisfy certain desirable properties. Motivated by this, we study the relevant question of how often a voting rule…
A voting system should not merely report the outcome: it should also provide sufficient evidence to convince reasonable observers that the reported outcome is correct. Many deployed systems, notably paperless DRE machines still in use in US…
We study online temporal voting, where a group of voters submit 0/1 approvals on sets of alternatives that arrive online over multiple rounds and a single alternative is chosen in each round. We introduce online variants of two well-known…
We consider the problem of manipulating elections by cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by several clones, i.e., new candidates that are so similar to c that each voter simply replaces c in his vote…
We formalise definitions of ballot secrecy and ballot independence by Smyth, JCS'21 as indistinguishability games in the computational model of security. These definitions improve upon Smyth, draft '21 to consider a wider class of voting…
The electoral criterion of independence of irrelevant alternatives, or IIA, states that a voting system is unacceptable if it would choose a different winner if votes were recounted after one of the losers had dropped out. But IIA confuses…
The independence clustering problem is considered in the following formulation: given a set $S$ of random variables, it is required to find the finest partitioning $\{U_1,\dots,U_k\}$ of $S$ into clusters such that the clusters…
We propose the Sobolev Independence Criterion (SIC), an interpretable dependency measure between a high dimensional random variable X and a response variable Y . SIC decomposes to the sum of feature importance scores and hence can be used…
Recently P. Wocjan and M. Horodecki [quant-ph/0503129] gave a characterization of combinatorially independent permutation separability criteria. Combinatorial independence is a necessary condition for permutations to yield truly independent…
In elections, a set of candidates ranked consecutively (though possibly in different order) by all voters is called a clone set, and its members are called clones. A clone structure is a family of all clone sets of a given election. In this…
We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are widely satisfied by known voting procedures. The sixth axiom is a weakening of…
We describe efficient methods for screening clone libraries, based on pooling schemes which we call ``random $k$-sets designs''. In these designs, the pools in which any clone occurs are equally likely to be any possible selection of $k$…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of $m$ candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m$ candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on…
Information coefficient (IC) is a widely used metric for measuring investment managers' skills in selecting stocks. However, its adequacy and effectiveness for evaluating stock selection models has not been clearly understood, as IC from a…
We investigate the problem of designing randomized obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms in several canonical auction settings. Obvious strategy-proofness, introduced by Li [American Economic Review, 2017], strengthens the well-known…