Nash equilibrium of partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables

We consider a partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Two players (A and B) have the same payoff functions, and Player C does not. Two strategic variables are $t_i$'s and $s_i$'s for $i=A, B, C$. Mainly we will show the following results. 1. The equilibrium when all players choose $t_i$'s is equivalent to the equilibrium when Players A and B choose $t_i$'s and Player C chooses $s_C$ as their strategic variables. 2. The equilibrium when all players choose $s_i$'s is equivalent to the equilibrium when Players A and B choose $s_i$'s and Player C chooses $t_C$ as their strategic variables. The equilibrium when all players choose $t_i$'s and the equilibrium when all players choose $s_i$'s are not equivalent although they are equivalent in a symmetric game in which all players have the same payoff functions.