Successful Nash Equilibrium Agent for a 3-Player Imperfect-Information Game
Computer Science and Game Theory
2018-11-07 v1 Artificial Intelligence
Multiagent Systems
Theoretical Economics
Abstract
Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, but no guarantees in non-zero-sum games or in games with more than two players. We describe an agent that is able to defeat a variety of realistic opponents using an exact Nash equilibrium strategy in a 3-player imperfect-information game. This shows that, despite a lack of theoretical guarantees, agents based on Nash equilibrium strategies can be successful in multiplayer games after all.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1804.04789,
title = {Successful Nash Equilibrium Agent for a 3-Player Imperfect-Information Game},
author = {Sam Ganzfried and Austin Nowak and Joannier Pinales},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.04789},
year = {2018}
}