相关论文: Performance Analysis for Brandt's Conclusive Entan…

In practical quantum cryptography, the source sometimes produces multi-photon pulses, thus enabling the eavesdropper Eve to perform the powerful photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack. Recently, it was shown by Curty and Lutkenhaus [Phys.…

In this letter, we concentrate on the very recently proposed Measurement Device Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI QKD) protocol by Lo, Curty and Qi (PRL, 2012). We study how one can suitably present an eavesdropping strategy on MDI…

We address estimation of one-parameter unitary gates for qubit systems and seek for optimal probes and measurements. Single- and two-qubit probes are analyzed in details focusing on precision and stability of the estimation procedure.…

We consider the Bennett-Brassard cryptographic scheme, which uses two conjugate quantum bases. An eavesdropper who attempts to obtain information on qubits sent in one of the bases causes a disturbance to qubits sent in the other basis. We…

This paper discusses the use of computer-aided verification as a practical means for analysing quantum information systems; specifically, the BB84 protocol for quantum key distribution is examined using this method. This protocol has been…

In conventional quantum key distribution protocols, the secure key is normally extracted from the measurement outcomes of the system. Here, a different approach is proposed, where the secure key is extracted from the measurement bases,…

Phase randomization is a very important assumption in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution (QKD) system with a weak coherent source. Thus an active phase modulator is needed to randomize the phase of source. However, it is…

We have implemented an experimental set-up in order to demonstrate the feasibility of time-coding protocols for quantum key distribution. Alice produces coherent 20 ns faint pulses of light at 853 nm. They are sent to Bob with delay 0 ns…

In the realistic quantum key distribution (QKD), Alice and Bob respectively get a quantum state from an unknown channel, whose dimension may be unknown. However, while discussing the security, sometime we need to know exact dimension, since…

The ideal Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol is based on the preparation and measurement of qubits in two alternative bases differing by an angle of pi/2. Any real implementation of the protocol, though, will…

In this paper we present the quantum control attack on quantum key distribution systems. The cornerstone of the attack is that Eve can use unitary (polar) decomposition of her positive-operator valued measure elements, which allows her to…

We investigate optimal discrimination between two projective single-qubit measurements in a scenario where the measurement can be performed only once. We consider general setting involving a tunable fraction of inconclusive outcomes and we…

Quantum key distribution using three states in equiangular configuration combines a security threshold comparable with the one of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol and a quantum bit error rate (QBER) estimation that does not need to reveal…

Evaluating the theoretical limit of the amount of information Eve can steal from a quantum key distribution protocol under given conditions is one of the most important things that need to be done in security proof. In addition to source…

Quantum key distribution (QKD) can share an unconditional secure key between two remote parties, but the deviation between theory and practice will break the security of the generated key. In this paper, we evaluate the security of QKD with…

The complete characterisation of the charge transport in a mesoscopic device is provided by the Full Counting Statistics (FCS) $P_t(m)$, describing the amount of charge $Q = me$ transmitted during the time $t$. Although numerous systems…

In this article I present a protocol for quantum cryptography which is secure against attacks on individual signals. It is based on the Bennett-Brassard protocol of 1984 (BB84). The security proof is complete as far as the use of single…

The lists of bits processed in quantum key distribution are necessarily of finite length. The need for finite-key unconditional security bounds has been recognized long ago, but the theoretical tools have become available only very…

We introduce a simple protocol for verifiable measurement-only blind quantum computing. Alice, a client, can perform only single-qubit measurements, whereas Bob, a server, can generate and store entangled many-qubit states. Bob generates…

We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. Our proof applies when both the source and the detector have…