相关论文: Stochastic stability in spatial games

We discuss the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash…

We discuss long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting agents. In particular, three-player spatial games are studied. The effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria is…

We discuss similarities and differencies between systems of many interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. We analyze long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many…

We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of…

Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…

We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…

Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…

One of the contributions of this work is to formulate the problem of energy-efficient power control in multiple access channels (namely, channels which comprise several transmitters and one receiver) as a stochastic differential game. The…

Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…

We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…

We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between…

The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the…

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we…

Learning processes in games explain how players grapple with one another in seeking an equilibrium. We study a natural model of learning based on individual gradients in two-player continuous games. In such games, the arguably natural…

We consider a tournament among four equally strong semifinalists. The players have to decide how much stamina to use in the semifinals, provided that the rest is available in the final and the third-place playoff. We investigate optimal…

We study a class of games which model the competition among agents to access some service provided by distributed service units and which exhibit congestion and frustration phenomena when service units have limited capacity. We propose a…

Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

We discuss and solve a model for a game with many players, where a subset of truely deciding players is embedded into a hierarchy of dependent agents. These interdependencies modify the game matrix and the Nash equilibria for the deciding…

This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…