相关论文: Random Matching with Minimums
Fair division is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings, where the goal is to divide a set of resources among agents in a fair manner. We study the case where m indivisible items need to be divided among n agents with…
We consider object allocation problems with capacities (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1998; Basteck, 2025) where objects have to be assigned to agents. We show that if a lottery rule satisfies ex-post non-wastefulness and…
We propose the Pseudo-Mallows distribution over the set of all permutations of $n$ items, to approximate the posterior distribution with a Mallows likelihood. The Mallows model has been proven to be useful for recommender systems where it…
In this paper, we study planning in stochastic systems, modeled as Markov decision processes (MDPs), with preferences over temporally extended goals. Prior work on temporal planning with preferences assumes that the user preferences form a…
We study ensemble-based graph-theoretical methods aiming to approximate the size of the minimum dominating set (MDS) in scale-free networks. We analyze both analytical upper bounds of dominating sets and numerical realizations for…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time…
We consider fair division of a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations using the fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). MMS is the most popular share-based notion, in which an agent finds an allocation fair to…
Multi-Objective Optimization (MOO) is an important problem in real-world applications. However, for a non-trivial problem, no single solution exists that can optimize all the objectives simultaneously. In a typical MOO problem, the goal is…
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize…
When allocating indivisible objects via lottery, planners often use ordinal mechanisms, which elicit agents' rankings of objects rather than their full preferences over lotteries. In such an ordinal informational environment, planners…
We (claim to) prove the extremely surprising fact that NP=RP. It is achieved by creating a Fully Polynomial-Time Randomized Approximation Scheme (FPRAS) for approximately counting the number of independent sets in bounded degree graphs,…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
The partial monitoring (PM) framework provides a theoretical formulation of sequential learning problems with incomplete feedback. On each round, a learning agent plays an action while the environment simultaneously chooses an outcome. The…
We initiate the study of smoothed analysis for the sequential probability assignment problem with contexts. We study information-theoretically optimal minmax rates as well as a framework for algorithmic reduction involving the maximum…
We study stochastic combinatorial optimization problems where the objective is to minimize the expected maximum load (a.k.a.\ the makespan). In this framework, we have a set of $n$ tasks and $m$ resources, where each task $j$ uses some…
We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous and indivisible goods among strategic agents, with preferences over subsets of goods, when there is no medium of exchange. This model captures the well studied problem of fair allocation…
When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated…
Wagering mechanisms are one-shot betting mechanisms that elicit agents' predictions of an event. For deterministic wagering mechanisms, an existing impossibility result has shown incompatibility of some desirable theoretical properties. In…
We consider the assignment problem, where $n$ agents have to be matched to $n$ items. Each agent has a preference order over the items. In the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism the agents act in a particular order and pick their most…