相关论文: Beyond Rational Illusion: Behaviorally Realistic S…

We address the question of repeatedly learning linear classifiers against agents who are strategically trying to game the deployed classifiers, and we use the Stackelberg regret to measure the performance of our algorithms. First, we show…

Capability planning problems are pervasive throughout many areas of human interest with prominent examples found in defense and security. Planning provides a unique context for optimization that has not been explored in great detail and…

Machine learning relies on the assumption that unseen test instances of a classification problem follow the same distribution as observed training data. However, this principle can break down when machine learning is used to make important…

We study strategic classification in binary decision-making settings where agents can modify their features in order to improve their classification outcomes. Importantly, our work considers the causal structure across different features,…

Uncertainty in optimization is often represented as stochastic parameters in the optimization model. In Predict-Then-Optimize approaches, predictions of a machine learning model are used as values for such parameters, effectively…

Strategic decision-making involves interactive reasoning where agents adapt their choices in response to others, yet existing evaluations of large language models (LLMs) often emphasize Nash Equilibrium (NE) approximation, overlooking the…

We study interactions between strategic players and markets whose behavior is guided by an algorithm. Algorithms use data from prior interactions and a limited set of decision rules to prescribe actions. While as-if rational play need not…

Game theory serves as a powerful tool for distributed optimization in multi-agent systems in different applications. In this paper we consider multi-agent systems that can be modeled by means of potential games whose potential function…

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the…

We consider an online regression setting in which individuals adapt to the regression model: arriving individuals are aware of the current model, and invest strategically in modifying their own features so as to improve the predicted score…

Bias exists in how we pick leaders, who we perceive as being influential, and who we interact with, not only in society, but in organizational contexts. Drawing from leadership emergence and social influence theories, we investigate…

Small language models (SLM) are increasingly used as interactive decision-making agents, yet most decision-oriented evaluations ignore emotion as a causal factor influencing behavior. We study emotion-sensitive decision making by combining…

We propose a novel method for selective classification (SC), a problem which allows a classifier to abstain from predicting some instances, thus trading off accuracy against coverage (the fraction of instances predicted). In contrast to…

We introduce a novel learning and planning framework that replaces traditional reward-based optimisation with constructive logical inference. In our model, actions, transitions, and goals are represented as logical propositions, and…

Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…

I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The…

In economic theory, an agent chooses from available alternatives -- modeled as a set. In decisions in the field or in the lab, however, agents do not have access to the set of alternatives at once. Instead, alternatives are represented by…

We examine hypothesis testing within a principal-agent framework, where a strategic agent, holding private beliefs about the effectiveness of a product, submits data to a principal who decides on approval. The principal employs a hypothesis…

This paper analyzes a dynamic interaction between a fully rational, privately informed sender and a boundedly rational, uninformed receiver with memory constraints. The sender controls the flow of information, while the receiver designs a…

In strategic classification, agents manipulate their features, at a cost, to receive a positive classification outcome from the learner's classifier. The goal of the learner in such settings is to learn a classifier that is robust to…