相关论文: Correlated optimin

We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…

We focus on the problem of finding an optimal strategy for a team of two players that faces an opponent in an imperfect-information zero-sum extensive-form game. Team members are not allowed to communicate during play but can coordinate…

The widening inequality in income distribution in recent years, and the associated excessive pay packages of CEOs in the U.S. and elsewhere, is of growing concern among policy makers as well as the common person. However, there seems to be…

We consider the division of a finite number of homogeneous divisible items among three players. Under the assumption that each player assigns a positive value to every item, we characterize the optimal allocations and we develop two exact…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…

We study the classic divide-and-choose method for equitably allocating divisible goods between two players who are rational, self-interested Bayesian agents. The players have additive values for the goods. The prior distributions on those…

We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…

It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or…

We study best-response type learning dynamics for zero-sum polymatrix games under two information settings. The two settings are distinguished by the type of information that each player has about the game and their opponents' strategy. The…

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…

This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…

Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality are two distinct concepts when dealing with multiple criteria. It is well known that the two concepts do not coincide. However, in this work we show that it is possible to characterize the set of all…

In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games…

I give an analysis of the simplest non-commutative quantum game, which is a gambling game much like Heads or Tails. The quantum gamespace displays strategies which are not interpretable through direct-product strategies of the two players.…

In repeated games, cooperation is possible in equilibrium only if players are sufficiently patient, and long-term gains from cooperation outweigh short-term gains from deviation. What happens if the players have incomplete information…

A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…

Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…

This paper extends the optimal-trading framework developed in arXiv:2409.03586v1 to compute optimal strategies with real-world constraints. The aim of the current paper, as with the previous, is to study trading in the context of…

Coordinating the behaviour of self-interested agents in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria is a major research challenge for multi-agent systems. Pre-game communication between all the players can aid coordination in cases where the…

We present efficient algorithms for computing optimal or approximately optimal strategies in a zero-sum game for which Player I has n pure strategies and Player II has an arbitrary number of pure strategies. We assume that for any given…