相关论文: Active Defense Against False Data Injection Attack…
Intelligently designed false data injection (FDI) attacks have been shown to be able to bypass the $\chi^2$-test based bad data detector (BDD), resulting in physical consequences (such as line overloads) in the power system. In this paper,…
This paper studies physical consequences of unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks designed only with information inside a sub-network of the power system. The goal of this attack is to overload a chosen target line without being…
The cybersecurity of microgrid has received widespread attentions due to the frequently reported attack accidents against distributed energy resource (DER) manufactures. Numerous impact mitigation schemes have been proposed to reduce or…
We address the problem of constructing false data injection (FDI) attacks that can bypass the bad data detector (BDD) of a power grid. The attacker is assumed to have access to only power flow measurement data traces (collected over a…
Data analysis and monitoring on smart grids are jeopardized by attacks on cyber-physical systems. False data injection attack (FDIA) is one of the classes of those attacks that target the smart measurement devices by injecting malicious…
Power systems are moving towards hybrid AC/DC grids with the integration of HVDC links, renewable resources and energy storage modules. New models of frequency control have to consider the complex interactions between these components.…
State estimation is a data processing algorithm for converting redundant meter measurements and other information into an estimate of the state of a power system. Relying heavily on meter measurements, state estimation has proven to be…
A novel false data injection attack (FDIA) model against DC state estimation is proposed, which requires no network parameters and exploits only limited phasor measurement unit (PMU) data. The proposed FDIA model can target specific states…
As an important cyber-physical system (CPS), smart grid is highly vulnerable to cyber attacks. Amongst various types of attacks, false data injection attack (FDIA) proves to be one of the top-priority cyber-related issues and has received…
This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through their physical consequences. Prior work has shown that an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used to…
Smart grids are inherently susceptible to various types of malicious cyberattacks that have all been documented in the recent literature. Traditional cybersecurity research on power systems often utilizes simplified models that fail to…
This paper introduces a novel two-stage framework for online mitigation of False Data Injection (FDI) signals to improve the resiliency of Networked Control Systems (NCSs) and ensure their safe operation in the presence of malicious…
This paper demonstrates the viability of perfectly undetectable affine transformation attacks against robotic manipulators where intelligent attackers can inject multiplicative and additive false data while remaining completely hidden from…
False data injection attacks (FDIAs) pose a persistent challenge to AC power system state estimation. In current practice, detection relies primarily on topology-aware residual-based tests that assume malicious measurements can be…
The application of Deep Learning-based Schemes (DLSs) for detecting False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) in smart grids has attracted significant attention. This paper demonstrates that adversarial attacks, carefully crafted FDIAs, can…
Data injection attacks (DIAs) pose a significant cybersecurity threat to the Smart Grid by enabling an attacker to compromise the integrity of data acquisition and manipulate estimated states without triggering bad data detection…
The rapid growth of AI-driven data centers and large-scale energy storage systems is increasing the reliance of power system operation on real-time measurement data and automated decision-making. However, many existing detection methods…
An unobservable false data injection (FDI) attack on AC state estimation (SE) is introduced and its consequences on the physical system are studied. With a focus on understanding the physical consequences of FDI attacks, a bi-level…
This paper assesses the resilience of IEC 61850 digital substations under False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) targeting the Sampled Values (SV) protocol. The multicast nature of SV, while enabling time-critical automation, exposes…
Machine learning (ML)-based detectors have been shown to be effective in detecting stealthy false data injection attacks (FDIAs) that can bypass conventional bad data detectors (BDDs) in power systems. However, ML models are also vulnerable…