相关论文: Convergence of Stochastic First-Order Algorithms i…

This paper examines whether widely used online learning algorithms in pricing can independently reach competitive outcomes or instead foster tacit collusion. This issue has drawn considerable attention from competition regulators as…

Two issues of algorithmic collusion are addressed in this paper. First, we show that in a general class of symmetric games, including Prisoner's Dilemma, Bertrand competition, and any (nonlinear) mixture of first and second price auction,…

The rise of algorithmic pricing in online retail platforms has attracted significant interest in how autonomous software agents interact under competition. This article explores the potential emergence of algorithmic collusion -…

Equilibrium problems in Bayesian auction games can be described as systems of differential equations. Depending on the model assumptions, these equations might be such that we do not have a rigorous mathematical solution theory. The lack of…

In an infinitely repeated general-sum pricing game, independent reinforcement learners may exhibit collusive behavior without any communication, raising concerns about algorithmic collusion. To better understand the learning dynamics, we…

The convergence properties of learning dynamics in repeated auctions is a timely and important question, with numerous applications in, e.g., online advertising markets. This work focuses on repeated first-price auctions where bidders with…

Nowadays, a significant share of the Business-to-Consumer sector is based on online platforms like Amazon and Alibaba and uses Artificial Intelligence for pricing strategies. This has sparked debate on whether pricing algorithms may tacitly…

In the Bayesian Reinforcement Learning (BRL) setting, agents try to maximise the collected rewards while interacting with their environment while using some prior knowledge that is accessed beforehand. Many BRL algorithms have already been…

We study deterministic and stochastic primal-dual sub-gradient algorithms for distributed optimization of a separable objective function with global inequality constraints. In both algorithms, the norm of the Lagrangian multipliers are…

We examine a wide class of stochastic approximation algorithms for solving (stochastic) nonlinear problems on Riemannian manifolds. Such algorithms arise naturally in the study of Riemannian optimization, game theory and optimal transport,…

There has been substantial recent concern that pricing algorithms might learn to ``collude.'' Supra-competitive prices can emerge as a Nash equilibrium of repeated pricing games, in which sellers play strategies which threaten to punish…

The Robbins-Monro stochastic approximation algorithm is a foundation of many algorithmic frameworks for reinforcement learning (RL), and often an efficient approach to solving (or approximating the solution to) complex optimal control…

Learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions is a fundamental problem at the interface of game theory and machine learning, which has seen a recent surge in interest due to the transition of display advertising to first-price auctions.…

Nowadays, a significant share of the business-to-consumer sector is based on online platforms like Amazon and Alibaba and uses AI for pricing strategies. This has sparked debate on whether pricing algorithms may tacitly collude to set…

We test the performance of deep deterministic policy gradient (DDPG), a deep reinforcement learning algorithm, able to handle continuous state and action spaces, to learn Nash equilibria in a setting where firms compete in prices. These…

Firms' algorithm development practices are often homogeneous. Whether firms train algorithms on similar data, aim at similar benchmarks, or rely on similar pre-trained models, the result is correlated predictions. We model the impact of…

This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…

As algorithms increasingly mediate competitive decision-making, their influence extends beyond individual outcomes to shaping strategic market dynamics. In two preregistered experiments, we examined how algorithmic advice affects human…

Online learning to rank (OLTR) interactively learns to choose lists of items from a large collection based on certain click models that describe users' click behaviors. Most recent works for this problem focus on the stochastic environment…

We study the Bayesian coarse correlated equilibrium (BCCE) of continuous and discretised first-price and all-pay auctions under the standard symmetric independent private-values model. Our study is motivated by the question of how the…