相关论文: Data-Augmented Game Starts for Accelerating Self-P…

We address the problem of solving parity games with imperfect information on finite graphs of bounded structural complexity. It is a major open problem whether parity games with perfect information can be solved in PTIME. Restricting the…

Optimization of parameterized policies for reinforcement learning (RL) is an important and challenging problem in artificial intelligence. Among the most common approaches are algorithms based on gradient ascent of a score function…

We formulate and study a general time-varying multi-agent system where players repeatedly compete under incomplete information. Our work is motivated by scenarios commonly observed in online advertising and retail marketplaces, where agents…

We consider a stochastic game with partial, asymmetric and non-classical information, where the agents are trying to acquire as many available opportunities/locks as possible. Agents have access only to local information, the information…

Zero-sum asymmetric games model decision making scenarios involving two competing players who have different information about the game being played. A particular case is that of nested information, where one (informed) player has superior…

Traditional solvable game theory and mean-field-type game theory (risk-aware games) predominantly focus on quadratic costs due to their analytical tractability. Nevertheless, they often fail to capture critical non-linearities inherent in…

We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…

We propose a simple, general and effective technique, Reward Randomization for discovering diverse strategic policies in complex multi-agent games. Combining reward randomization and policy gradient, we derive a new algorithm,…

In this paper, the problem of false information injection attack and defense on state estimation in dynamic multi-sensor systems is investigated from a game theoretic perspective. The relationship between the Kalman filter and the adversary…

We develop an empirical framework for analyzing dynamic games when the underlying information structure is unknown to the analyst. We introduce \textit{Markov correlated equilibrium}, a dynamic analog of Bayes correlated equilibrium, and…

Two fundamental problems in computational game theory are computing a Nash equilibrium and learning to exploit opponents given observations of their play (opponent exploitation). The latter is perhaps even more important than the former:…

Decomposition, i.e. independently analyzing possible subgames, has proven to be an essential principle for effective decision-making in perfect information games. However, in imperfect information games, decomposition has proven to be…

Real-world games, which concern imperfect information, multiple players, and simultaneous moves, are less frequently discussed in the existing literature of game theory. While reinforcement learning (RL) provides a general framework to…

Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We…

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game…

Recently, many researchers have made successful progress in building the AI systems for MOBA-game-playing with deep reinforcement learning, such as on Dota 2 and Honor of Kings. Even though these AI systems have achieved or even exceeded…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

Autonomous agents should coordinate effectively without prior knowledge of others' intents. While prior work has focused on intent inference, we address the inverse problem: how agents can strategically demonstrate their intents within…

Multi-agent reinforcement learning, despite its popularity and empirical success, faces significant scalability challenges in large-population dynamic games. Graphon mean field games (GMFGs) offer a principled framework for approximating…

In this paper we investigate the Follow the Regularized Leader dynamics in sequential imperfect information games (IIG). We generalize existing results of Poincar\'e recurrence from normal-form games to zero-sum two-player imperfect…