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A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2022-05-24 Deniz Kattwinkel , Axel Niemeyer , Justus Preusser , Alexander Winter

We study public persuasion when a sender communicates with a large audience that can fact-check at heterogeneous costs. The sender commits to a public information policy before the state is realized, but any verifiable claim she makes after…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2025-10-07 Georgy Lukyanov , Samuel Safaryan

A principal funds a multistage project and retains the right to cut the funding if it stagnates at some point. An agent wants to convince the principal to fund the project as long as possible, and can design the flow of information about…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2023-01-26 Maxim Senkov

Multi-agent reinforcement learning offers a way to study how communication could emerge in communities of agents needing to solve specific problems. In this paper, we study the emergence of communication in the negotiation environment, a…

人工智能 · 计算机科学 2018-04-12 Kris Cao , Angeliki Lazaridou , Marc Lanctot , Joel Z Leibo , Karl Tuyls , Stephen Clark

A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither how the agent learns nor what the agent discovers are contractible, we show the principal is unconstrained as to what information the agent…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2023-07-31 Mark Whitmeyer , Kun Zhang

Persuasion studies how a principal can influence agents' decisions via strategic information revelation --- often described as a signaling scheme --- in order to yield the most desirable equilibrium outcome. Recently, there has been a large…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2019-10-22 Haifeng Xu

We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2024-03-22 Alistair Barton

We study the classic principal-agent model when the signal observed by the principal is chosen by the agent. We fully characterize the optimal information structure from an agent's perspective in a general moral hazard setting with limited…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2023-07-25 Majid Mahzoon , Ali Shourideh , Ariel Zetlin-Jones

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. These are problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme in order to incentivize some agents to take costly, unobservable actions that lead…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-02-01 Matteo Castiglioni , Alberto Marchesi , Nicola Gatti

We study multidimensional cheap talk with simple language and aligned preferences. An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score that aggregates a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message. Even though the expert…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2026-02-05 Jacopo Bizzotto , Nathan Hancart

We model the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2025-07-09 Gerrit Bauch , Manuel Foerster

We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2026-03-05 Yingkai Li , Xiaoyun Qiu

In principal-agent models, a principal offers a contract to an agent to perform a certain task. The agent exerts a level of effort that maximizes her utility. The principal is oblivious to the agent's chosen level of effort, and conditions…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2022-07-14 Alon Cohen , Moran Koren , Argyrios Deligkas

A principal designs an algorithm that generates a publicly observable prediction of a binary state. She must decide whether to act directly based on the prediction or to delegate the decision to an agent with private information but…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2024-02-22 Ruqing Xu

We consider a principal agent project selection problem with asymmetric information. There are $N$ projects and the principal must select exactly one of them. Each project provides some profit to the principal and some payoff to the agent…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2025-04-15 Sumit Goel , Wade Hann-Caruthers

We study a model of delegation in which a principal takes a multidimensional action and an agent has private information about a multidimensional state of the world. The principal can design any direct mechanism, including stochastic ones.…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2022-08-26 Andreas Kleiner

Individuals, despite having varied life experiences and learning processes, can communicate effectively through languages. This study aims to explore the efficiency of language as a communication medium. We put forth two specific…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2024-10-21 Hang Chen , Yuchuan Jang , Weijie Zhou , Cristian Meo , Ziwei Chen , Dianbo Liu

Contemporary scientific research is a distributed, collaborative endeavor, carried out by teams of researchers, regulatory institutions, funding agencies, commercial partners, and scientific bodies, all interacting with each other and…

统计方法学 · 统计学 2024-02-09 Stephen Bates , Michael I. Jordan , Michael Sklar , Jake A. Soloff

We focus on the scenario in which an agent can exploit his information advantage to manipulate the outcome of an election. In particular, we study district-based elections with two candidates, in which the winner of the election is the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2020-12-11 Matteo Castiglioni , Nicola Gatti

I propose a cheap-talk model in which the sender can use private messages and only cares about persuading a subset of her audience. For example, a candidate only needs to persuade a majority of the electorate in order to win an election. I…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2019-03-04 Bruno Salcedo