相关论文: Computing Thiele Rules on Interval Elections and t…
The classical paradox of social choice theory asserts that there is no fair way to deterministically select a winner in an election among more than two candidates; the only definite collective preferences are between individual pairs of…
An election is a pair $(C,V)$ of candidates and voters. Each vote is a ranking (permutation) of the candidates. An election is $d$-Euclidean if there is an embedding of both candidates and voters into $\mathbb{R}^d$ such that voter $v$…
In real-world Tool-Integrated Reasoning (TIR) scenarios, where LLMs interleave reasoning with external tool calls, a major source of inefficiency is that the toolcalls create pauses between LLM requests and cause KV-Cache eviction, forcing…
Aggregating preferences under incomplete or constrained feedback is a fundamental problem in social choice and related domains. While prior work has established strong impossibility results for pairwise comparisons, this paper extends the…
Probabilistic programming provides a high-level framework for specifying statistical models as executable programs with built-in randomness and conditioning. Existing inference techniques, however, typically compute posterior distributions…
The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (Par), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and…
Consider elections where the set of candidates is partitioned into parties, and each party must nominate exactly one candidate. The Possible President problem asks whether some candidate of a given party can become the winner of the…
Selective inference (SI) has been actively studied as a promising framework for statistical hypothesis testing for data-driven hypotheses. The basic idea of SI is to make inferences conditional on an event that a hypothesis is selected. In…
The computational study of elections generally assumes that the preferences of the electorate come in as a list of votes. Depending on the context, it may be much more natural to represent the list succinctly, as the distinct votes of the…
One-sided matching problems with ordinal preferences, such as hostel room allocation, are commonly solved using the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism, which guarantees Pareto-optimal (PO) outcomes. However, TTC does not yield a unique…
We consider a spatial voting model where both candidates and voters are positioned in the $d$-dimensional Euclidean space, and each voter ranks candidates based on their proximity to the voter's ideal point. We focus on the scenario where…
We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints,…
In Approval-Based Committee (ABC) voting, each voter lists the candidates they approve and then a voting rule aggregates the individual approvals into a committee that represents the collective choice of the voters. An extensively studied…
In a recently introduced model of successive committee elections (Bredereck et al., AAAI-20) for a given set of ordinal or approval preferences one aims to find a sequence of a given length of "best" same-size committees such that each…
A central goal of probabilistic programming languages (PPLs) is to separate modelling from inference. However, this goal is hard to achieve in practice. Users are often forced to re-write their models in order to improve efficiency of…
We study a generalization of the standard approval-based model of participatory budgeting (PB), in which voters are providing approval ballots over a set of predefined projects and -- in addition to a global budget limit, there are several…
Temporal Point Processes (TPP) with partial likelihoods involving a latent structure often entail an intractable marginalization, thus making inference hard. We propose a novel approach to Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) involving…
We introduce the notion of {\em Distance Restricted Manipulation}, where colluding manipulator(s) need to compute if there exist votes which make their preferred alternative win the election when their knowledge about the others' votes is a…
We study the law of the iterated logarithm (LIL) for the maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters (as a convex optimization problem) in the generalized linear models with independent or weakly dependent ($\rho$-mixing, $m$-dependent)…
We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target number of candidates are selected. Aziz et al. (2015) proposed two representation axioms called justified…