相关论文: Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Matching Markets

The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) famously stated that prices fully reflect the information available to traders. This critically depends on the transfer of information into prices through trading strategies. Traders optimise their…

We study a Markov matching market involving a planner and a set of strategic agents on the two sides of the market. At each step, the agents are presented with a dynamical context, where the contexts determine the utilities. The planner…

Market making is a fundamental trading problem in which an agent provides liquidity by continually offering to buy and sell a security. The problem is challenging due to inventory risk, the risk of accumulating an unfavourable position and…

We study Matching and other related problems in a partial information setting where the agents' utilities for being matched to other agents are hidden and the mechanism only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is…

Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…

We apply Reinforcement Learning algorithms to solve the classic quantitative finance Market Making problem, in which an agent provides liquidity to the market by placing buy and sell orders while maximizing a utility function. The optimal…

In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signaling mechanisms, where applicants send a limited number of…

While the accuracy-fairness trade-off has been frequently observed in the literature of fair machine learning, rigorous theoretical analyses have been scarce. To demystify this long-standing challenge, this work seeks to develop a…

We construct prior-free auctions with constant-factor approximation guarantees with ordered bidders, in both unlimited and limited supply settings. We compare the expected revenue of our auctions on a bid vector to the monotone price…

We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem where an auctioneer sells an indivisible good to groups of buyers in every round, for a total of $T$ rounds. The auctioneer aims to maximize their discounted overall revenue while adhering to a…

This article explores the optimisation of trading strategies in Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) and centralised exchanges. We develop a model that accounts for the interaction between these two markets, estimating the conditional…

Recently, a randomized mechanism has been discovered [Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan; STOC'11] for combinatorial auctions that is truthful in expectation and guarantees a (1-1/e)-approximation to the optimal social welfare when players have…

The over-the-counter (OTC) market is characterized by a unique feature that allows market makers to adjust bid-ask spreads based on order size. However, this flexibility introduces complexity, transforming the market-making problem into a…

The global markets provide enterprises with selling opportunities and challenges in stabilizing operational strategies. From the perspective of production management, it is important to improve the profitability of an enterprise by…

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share, that is defined to be the maximum value that…

We study the social efficiency of bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer. In the classical Bayesian setting, the celebrated Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem states that no Bayesian incentive-compatible, individually…

Stochastic matching is the stochastic version of the well-known matching problem, which consists in maximizing the rewards of a matching under a set of probability distributions associated with the nodes and edges. In most stochastic…

Scheduling on related machines ($Q||C_{\max}$) is one of the most important problems in the field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Each machine is controlled by a selfish agent and her valuation can be expressed via a single parameter, her…

Motivated by an application in kidney exchange, we study the following query-commit problem: we are given the set of vertices of a non-bipartite graph G. The set of edges in this graph are not known ahead of time. We can query any pair of…

We study the probabilistic assignment of items to platforms that satisfies both group and individual fairness constraints. Each item belongs to specific groups and has a preference ordering over platforms. Each platform enforces group…