相关论文: TrojanLoC: LLM-based Framework for RTL Trojan Loca…

Logic locking and hardware Trojans are two fields in hardware security that have been mostly developed independently from each other. In this paper, we identify the relationship between these two fields. We find that a common structure that…

This work focuses on advancing security research in the hardware design space by formally defining the realistic problem of Hardware Trojan (HT) detection. The goal is to model HT detection more closely to the real world, i.e., describing…

Due to the current horizontal business model that promotes increasing reliance on untrusted third-party Intellectual Properties (IPs), CAD tools, and design facilities, hardware Trojan attacks have become a serious threat to the…

Due to the globalization of Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain, hardware trojans and the attacks that can trigger them have become an important security issue. One type of hardware Trojans leverages the don't care transitions in Finite…

Traditional learning-based approaches for run-time Hardware Trojan detection require complex and expensive on-chip data acquisition frameworks and thus incur high area and power overhead. To address these challenges, we propose to leverage…

With the rising popularity of machine learning and the ever increasing demand for computational power, there is a growing need for hardware optimized implementations of neural networks and other machine learning models. As the technology…

The use of third-party IP cores in implementing applications in FPGAs has given rise to the threat of malicious alterations through the insertion of hardware Trojans. To address this threat, it is important to predict the way hardware…

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a new paradigm of building natural language processing (NLP) systems: general-purpose, pre-trained language models (LMs) are composed with simple downstream models and fine-tuned for a variety of…

There are increasing concerns about possible malicious modifications of integrated circuits (ICs) used in critical applications. Such attacks are often referred to as hardware Trojans. While many techniques focus on hardware Trojan…

The globalized semiconductor supply chain has made Hardware Trojans (HT) a significant security threat to embedded systems, necessitating the design of efficient and adaptable detection mechanisms. Despite promising machine learning-based…

A major security threat to an integrated circuit (IC) design is the Hardware Trojan attack which is a malicious modification of the design. Previously several papers have investigated into side-channel analysis to detect the presence of…

Timely detection of Hardware Trojans (HTs) has become a major challenge for secure integrated circuits. We present a run-time methodology for HT detection that employs a multi-parameter statistical traffic modeling of the communication…

HTTP-based Trojan is extremely threatening, and it is difficult to be effectively detected because of its concealment and confusion. Previous detection methods usually are with poor generalization ability due to outdated datasets and…

Register Transfer Level (RTL) design translates high-level specifications into hardware using HDLs such as Verilog. Although LLM-based RTL generation is promising, the scarcity of functionally verifiable high-quality data limits both…

When the training data are maliciously tampered, the predictions of the acquired deep neural network (DNN) can be manipulated by an adversary known as the Trojan attack (or poisoning backdoor attack). The lack of robustness of DNNs against…

Many fabless semiconductor companies outsource their designs to third-party fabrication houses. As trustworthiness of chain after outsourcing including fabrication houses is not established, any adversary in between, with malicious intent…

The threat of hardware Trojans (HTs) in security-critical IPs like cryptographic accelerators poses severe security risks. The HT detection methods available today mostly rely on golden models and detailed circuit specifications. Often they…

Semiconductor design houses are increasingly becoming dependent on third party vendors to procure intellectual property (IP) and meet time-to-market constraints. However, these third party IPs cannot be trusted as hardware Trojans can be…

Owning a high-end semiconductor foundry is a luxury very few companies can afford. Thus, fabless design companies outsource integrated circuit fabrication to third parties. Within foundries, rogue elements may gain access to the customer's…

In Natural Language Processing (NLP), intelligent neuron models can be susceptible to textual Trojan attacks. Such attacks occur when Trojan models behave normally for standard inputs but generate malicious output for inputs that contain a…