相关论文: Should We Relax Stability in Matching Markets?

The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…

The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we initiate the study…

In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…

A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects…

Many countries around the world, including Korea, use the school choice lottery system. However, this method has a problem in that many students are assigned to less-preferred schools based on the lottery results. In addition, the task of…

In considering the college admissions problem, almost fifty years ago, Gale and Shapley came up with a simple abstraction based on preferences of students and colleges. They introduced the concept of stability and optimality; and proposed…

Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…

Peer-to-peer ride-sharing platforms like Uber, Lyft, and DiDi have revolutionized the transportation industry and labor market. At its essence, these systems tackle the bipartite matching problem between two populations: riders and drivers.…

The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) is the most widely accepted and used algorithm to match students, workers, or residents to colleges, firms or hospitals respectively. In this paper, we consider for the first time, the complexity of…

Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…

We study a practical two-sided matching problem of allocating children to daycare centers, which has significant social implications. We are cooperating with several municipalities in Japan and our goal is to devise a reliable and…

The celebrated Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance mechanism (EADA) improves the efficiency of the DA algorithm via consented priority violations. Notwithstanding its many merits, we show that EADA can improve only two students when an…

Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…

In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…

The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…

In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…

In real-world settings of the Deferred Acceptance stable matching algorithm, such as the American medical residency match (NRMP), school choice programs, and various national university entrance systems, candidates need to decide which…

Real-life applications of deferred-acceptance (DA) matching algorithms sometimes exhibit errors or changes to the matching inputs that are discovered only after the algorithm has been run and the results are announced to participants.…

A run of the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm may contain proposals that are sure to be rejected. We introduce the accelerated deferred acceptance algorithm that proceeds in a similar manner to DA but with sure-to-be rejected proposals…

As Mobility as a Service (MaaS) systems become increasingly popular, travel is changing from unimodal trips to personalized services offered by a platform of mobility operators. Evaluation of MaaS platforms depends on modeling both user…