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Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for N-person games, we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics consisting of a replicator-like drift adjusted by a penalty term that renders the boundary of the game's strategy space…

To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How…

In this paper we develop a novel approach to the convergence of Best-Response Dynamics for the family of interference games. Interference games represent the fundamental resource allocation conflict between users of the radio spectrum. In…

In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…

Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…

In this paper, the problem of distributively seeking the equilibria of aggregative games with bilevel structures is studied. Different from the traditional aggregative games, here the aggregation is determined by the minimizer of a virtual…

We consider multi-population Bayesian games with a large number of players. Each player aims at minimizing a cost function that depends on this player's own action, the distribution of players' actions in all populations, and an unknown…

For effective matching of resources (e.g., taxis, food, bikes, shopping items) to customer demand, aggregation systems have been extremely successful. In aggregation systems, a central entity (e.g., Uber, Food Panda, Ofo) aggregates supply…

In this paper, we propose a novel class of Nash problems for Cognitive Radio (CR) networks composed of multiple primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs) wherein each SU (player) competes against the others to maximize his own…

In this paper, we propose a novel class of Nash problems for Cognitive Radio (CR) networks, modeled as Gaussian frequency-selective interference channels, wherein each secondary user (SU) competes against the others to maximize his own…

The existence of simple uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years…

We derive the rate of convergence to the strongly variationally stable Nash equilibrium in a convex game, for a zeroth-order learning algorithm. Though we do not assume strong monotonicity of the game, our rates for the one-point feedback…

Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…

We consider the problem of learning Nash equilibrial policies for two-player risk-sensitive collision-avoiding interactions. Solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations of such general-sum differential games in real time is an open…

We introduce an online learning algorithm in the bandit feedback model that, once adopted by all agents of a congestion game, results in game-dynamics that converge to an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash Equilibrium in a polynomial number of…

This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We establish a…

This paper considers a conjecture-based distributed learning approach that enables autonomous nodes to independently optimize their transmission probabilities in random access networks. We model the interaction among multiple…

Under the uncoupled learning setup, the last-iterate convergence guarantee towards Nash equilibrium is shown to be impossible in many games. This work studies the last-iterate convergence guarantee in general games toward rationalizability,…

We show that, for any sufficiently small fixed $\epsilon > 0$, when both players in a general-sum two-player (bimatrix) game employ optimistic mirror descent (OMD) with smooth regularization, learning rate $\eta = O(\epsilon^2)$ and $T =…

The problem of computing a common point that lies in the intersection of a finite number of closed convex sets, each known to one agent in a network, is studied. This issue, known as the distributed convex feasibility problem or the…