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The emergent behaviour of autonomous robotic swarms poses a significant challenge to their safety assurance. Assurance tasks encompass adherence to standards, certification processes, and the execution of verification and validation (V&V)…

Many embedded and real-time systems have a inherent probabilistic behaviour (sensors data, unreliable hardware,...). In that context, it is crucial to evaluate system properties such as "the probability that a particular hardware fails".…

Robotics and Autonomous Systems are increasingly deployed in safety-critical domains, so that demonstrating their safety is essential. Assurance Cases (ACs) provide structured arguments supported by evidence, but generating and maintaining…

Software engineering of modular robotic systems is a challenging task, however, verifying that the developed components all behave as they should individually and as a whole presents its own unique set of challenges. In particular, distinct…

Self-adaptive systems (SASs) are capable of adjusting its behavior in response to meaningful changes in the operational con-text and itself. The adaptation needs to be performed automatically through self-managed reactions and…

A robotic system continuously measures its own motions and the external world during operation. Such measurements are with respect to some frame of reference, i.e., a coordinate system. A nontrivial robotic system has a large number of…

Model-based development enables quicker prototyping, earlier experimentation and validation of design intents. For a multi-agent system with complex asynchronous interactions and concurrency, formal verification, model-checking in…

This paper addresses the problem of improving response times of robots implemented in the Robotic Operating System (ROS) using formal verification of computational-time feasibility. In order to verify the real time behaviour of a robot…

Safety critical avionics software is a natural application area for formal verification. This is reflected in the formal method's inclusion into the certification guideline DO-178C and its formal methods supplement DO-333. Airbus and…

System integration testing is the process of testing a system by the stepwise integration of sub-components. Usually these sub-components are already verified to guarantee their correct functional behavior. By integration of these verified…

The increasing automation of vehicles is resulting in the integration of more extensive in-vehicle sensor systems, electronic control units, and software. Additionally, vehicle-to-everything communication is seen as an opportunity to extend…

Robots are soon going to be deployed in non-industrial environments. Before society can take such a step, it is necessary to endow complex robotic systems with mechanisms that make them reliable enough to operate in situations where the…

Autonomous robotic systems are complex, hybrid, and often safety-critical; this makes their formal specification and verification uniquely challenging. Though commonly used, testing and simulation alone are insufficient to ensure the…

Formal verification techniques have been playing an important role in pre-silicon validation processes. One of the most important points considered in performing formal verification is to define good verification scopes; we should define…

Dynamic formal verification is a key tool for providing ongoing confidence that a system is meeting its requirements while in use, especially when paired with static formal verification before the system is in use. This paper presents a…

Autonomous systems must sustain justified confidence in their correctness and safety across their operational lifecycle-from design and deployment through post-deployment evolution. Traditional assurance methods often separate…

Autonomous systems are highly complex and present unique challenges for the application of formal methods. Autonomous systems act without human intervention, and are often embedded in a robotic system, so that they can interact with the…

Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are notoriously complex and hard to verify. In fact, it is not trivial to model a MAS, and even when a model is built, it is not always possible to verify, in a formal way, that it is actually behaving as we…

Realm Management Monitor (RMM) is an essential firmware component within the recent Arm Confidential Computing Architecture (Arm CCA). Previous work applies formal techniques to verify the specification and prototype reference…

The safety of automated driving systems must be justified by convincing arguments and supported by compelling evidence to persuade certification agencies, regulatory entities, and the general public to allow the systems on public roads.…