相关论文: Convergent Q-Learning for Infinite-Horizon General…

A significant roadblock to the development of principled multi-agent reinforcement learning is the fact that desired solution concepts like Nash equilibria may be intractable to compute. To overcome this obstacle, we take inspiration from…

Learning stationary policies in infinite-horizon general-sum Markov games (MGs) remains a fundamental open problem in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). While stationary strategies are preferred for their practicality, computing…

We introduce a new solution concept for bounded rational agents in finite normal-form general-sum games called Generalized Quantal Response Equilibrium (GQRE) which generalizes Quantal Response Equilibrium~\citep{mckelvey1995quantal}. In…

Provably efficient and robust equilibrium computation in general-sum Markov games remains a core challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Nash equilibrium is computationally intractable in general and brittle due to equilibrium…

Recent advances in mean-field game literature enable the reduction of large-scale multi-agent problems to tractable interactions between a representative agent and a population distribution. However, existing approaches typically assume a…

Dynamic games provide a fundamental framework for multi-agent decision-making over time, yet computing feedback Nash equilibria (FNEs) in infinite-horizon discrete-time linear-quadratic (LQ) settings remains computationally challenging.…

The interplay between exploration and exploitation in competitive multi-agent learning is still far from being well understood. Motivated by this, we study smooth Q-learning, a prototypical learning model that explicitly captures the…

We motivate and propose a new model for non-cooperative Markov game which considers the interactions of risk-aware players. This model characterizes the time-consistent dynamic "risk" from both stochastic state transitions (inherent to the…

Theory of Mind benchmarks for large language models typically produce aggregate scores without theoretical grounding, making it unclear whether high performance reflects strategic reasoning or surface-level heuristics. We introduce a…

We propose a generalization of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) built on a simple premise: some actions are more focal than others. In our model, which we call the Focal Quantal Response Equilibrium (Focal QRE), each player plays a…

Mean field games (MFGs) tractably model behavior in large agent populations. The literature on learning MFG equilibria typically focuses on finding Nash equilibria (NE), which assume perfectly rational agents and are hence implausible in…

We develop provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithms for two-player zero-sum finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous moves. To incorporate function approximation, we consider a family of Markov games where the reward…

In this paper, we study a generalization of Markov games and pseudo-games that we call Markov pseudo-games, which, like the former, captures time and uncertainty, and like the latter, allows for the players' actions to determine the set of…

We study the global convergence of policy optimization for finding the Nash equilibria (NE) in zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) games. To this end, we first investigate the landscape of LQ games, viewing it as a nonconvex-nonconcave…

Behavioral diversity, expert imitation, fairness, safety goals and others give rise to preferences in sequential decision making domains that do not decompose additively across time. We introduce the class of convex Markov games that allow…

Reinforcement learning has been successful both empirically and theoretically in single-agent settings, but extending these results to multi-agent reinforcement learning in general-sum Markov games remains challenging. This paper studies…

We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…

Traditional reinforcement learning (RL) aims to maximize the expected total reward, while the risk of uncertain outcomes needs to be controlled to ensure reliable performance in a risk-averse setting. In this paper, we consider the problem…

We study risk-sensitive multi-agent reinforcement learning under general-sum Markov games, where agents optimize the entropic risk measure of rewards with possibly diverse risk preferences. We show that using the regret naively adapted from…

Classical game-theoretic approaches for multi-agent systems in both the forward policy design problem and the inverse reward learning problem often make strong rationality assumptions: agents perfectly maximize expected utilities under…