相关论文: Lifting the maximally-entangledness assumption in …

Multi-defender Stackelberg Security Games (MSSG) have recently gained increasing attention in the literature. However, the solutions offered to date are highly sensitive, wherein even small perturbations in the attacker's utility or slight…

We propose a simple yet rich model to extend the notions of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of strategic games to the quantum setting, in which we then study the relations between classical and quantum equilibria. Unlike the…

A model of a quantum version of classical games should reproduce the original classical games in order to be able to make a comparative analysis of quantum and classical effects. We analyze a class of symmetric multipartite entangled states…

We identify a subtle security issue that impacts mechanism design in scenarios in which agents can absolutely commit to strategies. Absolute commitments allow the strategy of an agent to depend on the commitments made by the other agents.…

We introduce a game of trusted computation in which a sensor equipped with limited computing power leverages a central node to evaluate a specified function over a large dataset, collected over time. We assume that the central computer can…

Entangled quantum systems can exhibit correlations that cannot be simulated classically. For historical reasons such correlations are called "Bell inequality violations." We give two new two-player games with Bell inequality violations that…

Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…

We revisit the problem of solving two-player zero-sum games in the decentralized setting. We propose a simple algorithmic framework that simultaneously achieves the best rates for honest regret as well as adversarial regret, and in addition…

Automated verification techniques for stochastic games allow formal reasoning about systems that feature competitive or collaborative behaviour among rational agents in uncertain or probabilistic settings. Existing tools and techniques…

We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the…

This paper investigates a class of multi-player discrete games where each player aims to maximize its own utility function. Each player does not know the other players' action sets, their deployed actions or the structures of its own or the…

Game-playing proofs constitute a powerful framework for non-quantum cryptographic security arguments, most notably applied in the context of indifferentiability. An essential ingredient in such proofs is lazy sampling of random primitives.…

This article extends the idea of solving parity games by strategy iteration to non-deterministic strategies: In a non-deterministic strategy a player restricts himself to some non-empty subset of possible actions at a given node, instead of…

We revisit the well-studied problem of designing fair and manipulation-resistant tournament rules. In this problem, we seek a mechanism that (probabilistically) identifies the winner of a tournament after observing round-robin play among…

The interplay between exploration and exploitation in competitive multi-agent learning is still far from being well understood. Motivated by this, we study smooth Q-learning, a prototypical learning model that explicitly captures the…

Admissibility has been studied for games of infinite duration with Boolean objectives. We extend here this study to games of infinite duration with quantitative objectives. First, we show that, un- der the assumption that optimal worst-case…

Randomized benchmarking is a powerful technique to efficiently estimate the performance and reliability of quantum gates, circuits and devices. Here we propose to perform randomized benchmarking in a coherent way, where superpositions of…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

Best-response (BR) schemes represent an important avenue for learning equilibria in noncooperative games. However, extant rate guarantees for BR schemes generally necessitate stringent smoothness requirements on player objectives and the…