相关论文: Managing Procurement Auction Failure: Bid Requirem…

The online ads trading platform plays a crucial role in connecting publishers and advertisers and generates tremendous value in facilitating the convenience of our lives. It has been evolving into a more and more complicated structure. In…

We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof…

This paper studies mechanism design for auctions with externalities on budgets, a novel setting where the budgets that bidders commit are adjusted due to the externality of the competitors' allocation outcomes-a departure from traditional…

A seller wants to sell an item to $n$ buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a, b]$. To be robust, the seller chooses a DSIC mechanism…

We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common economic situations, and yet it has not been studied, to our…

We consider a dynamic pricing problem for repeated contextual second-price auctions with multiple strategic buyers who aim to maximize their long-term time discounted utility. The seller has limited information on buyers' overall demand…

In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a ``fund…

This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism…

Considering a lead-time-and price-sensitive demand, we investigate whether a client rejection policy, modeled as M/M/1/K system, can be more profitable than an all-client acceptance policy, modeled as M/M/1 system. We provide analytical…

With the advent and increasing consolidation of e-commerce, digital advertising has very recently replaced traditional advertising as the main marketing force in the economy. In the past four years, a particularly important development in…

Recently the online advertising market has exhibited a gradual shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions. Although there has been a line of works concerning online bidding strategies in first-price auctions, it still remains…

We study a bilateral trade problem where a principal has private information that is revealed with delay, such as a seller who does not yet know her production cost. Postponing the contracting process incurs a costly delay, while early…

We propose and estimate a model of demand and supply of annuities. To this end, we use rich data from Chile, where annuities are bought and sold in a private market via a two-stage process: first-price auctions followed by bargaining. We…

I study the design of auctions in which the auctioneer is assumed to have information only about the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation, but does not know the correlation structure of the joint distribution of bidders'…

Motivated by pricing in ad exchange markets, we consider the problem of robust learning of reserve prices against strategic buyers in repeated contextual second-price auctions. Buyers' valuations for an item depend on the context that…

We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…

Ethereum block builders run sealed auctions among searchers, but nothing in the protocol forces a builder to honor the auction outcome after observing submitted bundles. This paper studies the commitment problem. We model a builder who…

This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential auctions, simultaneous auctions, and the Trading Agent…

In this article we consider combinatorial markets with valuations only for singletons and pairs of buy/sell-orders for swapping two items in equal quantity. We provide an algorithm that permits polynomial time market-clearing and -pricing.…

In many natural settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not simultaneous. In such auctions, future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players. The goal of this paper is to develop a quantitative…