相关论文: Managing Procurement Auction Failure: Bid Requirem…
Current reserve procurement approaches ignore the stochastic nature of reserve asset availability itself and thus limit the type and volume of reserve offers. This paper develops a reliability-aware probabilistic approach that allows…
We modify the standard model of price competition with horizontally differentiated products, imperfect information, and search frictions by allowing consumers to flexibly acquire information about a product's match value during their…
We propose a simple randomized rule for the optimization of prices in revenue management with contextual information. It is known that the certainty equivalent pricing rule, albeit popular, is sub-optimal. We show that, by allowing a small…
First-price auctions have very recently swept the online advertising industry, replacing second-price auctions as the predominant auction mechanism on many platforms. This shift has brought forth important challenges for a bidder: how…
In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a "seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a mass product,…
Most modern ticketing systems rely on a first-come-first-serve or randomized allocation system to determine the allocation of tickets. Such systems has received considerable backlash in recent years due to its inequitable allotment and…
In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell a service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer $i$ has a private value $v_i$ for receiving the service and a feasibility constraint restricts which sets of…
We consider a class of auctions (Lowest Unique Bid Auctions) that have achieved a considerable success on the Internet. Bids are made in cents (of euro) and every bidder can bid as many numbers as she wants. The lowest unique bid wins the…
We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item's value only if the auction is won. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to…
In display advertising, advertisers want to achieve a marketing objective with constraints on budget and cost-per-outcome. This is usually formulated as an optimization problem that maximizes the total utility under constraints. The…
Amazon EC2 provides two most popular pricing schemes--i) the {\em costly} on-demand instance where the job is guaranteed to be completed, and ii) the {\em cheap} spot instance where a job may be interrupted. We consider a user can select a…
The society's insatiable appetites for personal data are driving the emergency of data markets, allowing data consumers to launch customized queries over the datasets collected by a data broker from data owners. In this paper, we study how…
Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) is an upcoming methodology that is considered to have advantages over the traditional decision theoretic and game theoretic approaches. ARA solutions for first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions have been found…
Single-shot auctions are commonly used as a means to sell goods, for example when selling ad space or allocating radio frequencies, however devising mechanisms for auctions with multiple bidders and multiple items can be complicated. It has…
We study the effect of interim feedback policies in a dynamic all-pay auction where two players bid over two stages to win a common-value prize. We show that sequential equilibrium outcomes are characterized by Cheapest Signal Equilibria,…
Advertisers in online ad auctions are increasingly using auto-bidding mechanisms to bid into auctions instead of directly bidding their value manually. One prominent auto-bidding format is the target cost-per-acquisition (tCPA) which…
I show that firms price almost competitively and consumers can infer product quality from prices in markets where firms differ in quality and production cost, and learning prices is costly. Bankruptcy risk or regulation links higher quality…
We study the partial and full set-asides and their implication for changes in bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid auctions in the context of United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) food procurement auctions. Using five years…
We study the problem of repeatedly auctioning off an item to one of $k$ bidders where: a) bidders have a per-round individual rationality constraint, b) bidders may leave the mechanism at any point, and c) the bidders' valuations are…
We perform a detailed theoretical study of the value of a class of participating policies with four key features: $(i)$ the policyholder is guaranteed a minimum interest rate on the policy reserve; $(ii)$ the contract can be terminated by…