相关论文: Metric Distortion of Obnoxious Distributed Voting

We examine strategy-proof elections to select a winner amongst a set of agents, each of whom cares only about winning. This impartial selection problem was introduced independently by Holzman and Moulin and Alon et al. Fisher and Klimm…

We consider the problem of multi-choice majority voting in a network of $n$ agents where each agent initially selects a choice from a set of $K$ possible choices. The agents try to infer the choice in majority merely by performing local…

In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are…

This paper investigates the problem of distributed stochastic approximation in multi-agent systems. The algorithm under study consists of two steps: a local stochastic approximation step and a diffusion step which drives the network to a…

We consider a convex unconstrained optimization problem that arises in a network of agents whose goal is to cooperatively optimize the sum of the individual agent objective functions through local computations and communications. For this…

Several elections run in the last years have been characterized by attempts to manipulate the result of the election through the diffusion of fake or malicious news over social networks. This problem has been recognized as a critical issue…

This work focuses on the problem of distributed optimization in multi-agent cyberphysical systems, where a legitimate agent's iterates are influenced both by the values it receives from potentially malicious neighboring agents, and by its…

The integrity of democratic elections depends on voters' access to accurate information. However, modern media environments, which are dominated by social media, provide malicious actors with unprecedented ability to manipulate elections…

We study a model of proxy voting where the candidates, voters, and proxies are all located on the real line, and instead of voting directly, each voter delegates its vote to the closest proxy. The goal is to find a set of proxies that is…

In the computational social choice literature, there has been great interest in understanding how computational complexity can act as a barrier against manipulation of elections. Much of this literature, however, makes the assumption that…

Election control considers the problem of an adversary who attempts to tamper with a voting process, in order to either ensure that their favored candidate wins (constructive control) or another candidate loses (destructive control). As…

A group of privately informed agents chooses between two alternatives. How should the decision rule be designed if agents are known to be biased in favor of one of the options? We address this question by considering the Condorcet Jury…

Considering a network with $n$ nodes, where each node initially votes for one (or more) choices out of $K$ possible choices, we present a Distributed Multi-choice Voting/Ranking (DMVR) algorithm to determine either the choice with maximum…

Liquid democracy is the principle of making collective decisions by letting agents transitively delegate their votes. Despite its significant appeal, it has become apparent that a weakness of liquid democracy is that a small subset of…

In this paper, we investigate the distributed shortest distance optimization problem for a multi-agent network to cooperatively minimize the sum of the quadratic distances from some convex sets, where each set is only associated with one…

We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a…

We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…

We study social choice mechanisms in an implicit utilitarian framework with a metric constraint, where the goal is to minimize \textit{Distortion}, the worst case social cost of an ordinal mechanism relative to underlying cardinal…

In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences…

In this paper, the mixed equilibrium problem with coupled inequality constraints in dynamic environments is solved by employing a multi-agent system, where each agent only has access to its own bifunction, its own constraint function, and…